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Abstract 
 
This thesis studies the ongoing climate change mitigation effort in Finland by using the 
country’s past transition towards an information economy as a benchmark. This paper 
regards the rapid development of the Finnish information and communications 
technology (ICT) industry in the late 1990s as exceptional, and largely attributable to a 
few key characteristics of the Finnish society at the time. More precisely, this paper 
identifies five influential Finnish attributes, and argues that together these features 
constitute an interpretation of a Finnish societal model that explains the previous 
economic changes. This paper goes on to investigate the influence of these 
characteristics in Finland’s current effort to abate its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
and develop a competitive clean technologies (cleantech) industry in the process. This 
thesis finds that the attributes that explain Finland’s rapid success in the area of ICT 
have the potential to significantly benefit Finland in its ambitions at present. 
Nevertheless, the paper shows that there are limits associated with Finland’s capability 
to deal with the issues at hand. This paper addresses these challenges, and recommends 
improvements in a few key areas. 
 
This thesis is 27,931 words long, excluding the bibliography and appendices.  
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Introduction  
 
  
 Today, as in the early 1990s, Finland is at a crossroad. Finland is once again 
looking to recover from a serious economic downturn, but more importantly from the 
decline of historically strong industries. In the last decade, globalisation has come to 
impact the Finnish economy with increasingly negative consequences, and the Finnish 
industrial flagships – information and communications technology (ICT) and forestry - 
are struggling to stay competitive. This reality has been well illustrated recently by 
Nokia’s deteriorating performance, with severe implications for Finland’s economy 
(Ali-Yrkkö et al., 2013). Finland has been in this situation once before, twenty years 
ago, and if we trust history to repeat itself a rapid revival may very well be within reach. 
 In the early 1990s, Finland was hard hit by an economic recession.1 Finnish 
GDP fell by 38 percent between 1991 and 1993, and unemployment flew from 3.1 
percent in 1990 to 16.4 percent in 1994 (World Bank, Word Development Indicators). 
From this deep economic downturn, however, Finland recovered remarkably fast. 
Economic growth averaged 4.5 percent between 1994 and 2000, faster than in the USA 
(4 percent) and well above the European Union (EU) average of 2.9 percent. 
Unemployment, on the other hand, fell by 6.7 percentage points (World Bank, WDI). 
Even more impressively, industrial production rose by an average 7 percent per year 
between 1992 and 2000, and labour productivity by an annual 6 percent on average 
(Kiander, 2004: 14). At the turn of the century, Finland had become one of the most 
competitive nations in the world. The World Economic Forum (WEF) ranked Finland 
first in 2000 in terms of competitiveness, and again every year up to 2006 (e.g. WEF, 
2002). The United Nations Technology Achievement Index (TAI) also placed Finland 
top in 2001, while the Institute for Management Development (IMD) ranked Finland 
third that year for competiveness (Desai et al., 2002: 103; IMD, 2001).2 In effect, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The recession in Finland was caused by two main factors. Firstly, by the swift deregulation of 
capital markets in the 1980s, which led to rising interest rates and prices, the deterioration of the 
Finnish balance of trade, and rising debt amongst firms and households (Kiander and Vartia, 
1996). Secondly, by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent foreign market for 
Finnish goods, which is estimated to have accounted for 2-3 percentage points of the Finnish 
GDP decline in 1991 (Ollus and Simola, 2006: 22). On top of these two factors, Finland’s 
crucial paper industry was in steep decline due to increasing supply on the world stage. 
2 Although the reliability of these indicators has been questioned, they provide at the very least a 
good qualitative account of Finland’s business environment.  
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Finland’s economic recovery and regained competiveness is largely attributable to a 
successful shift towards an information economy.3 In the 1990s Finland rapidly 
specialised itself in the production of ICT, and secured considerable export-led 
economic growth for itself in the process.  
 Today, more than in the early 1990s, Finland must contemplate the 
environmental consequences of its economic activity. Indeed, in light of commitments 
made to the global community, Finland has a responsibility to participate in the 
mitigation of climate change. The Finnish state must therefore work to decrease 
Finland’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, on top of restoring output and employment 
in the country. The two ambitions, however, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The 
emerging sector of clean technologies (cleantech), for one, has the potential to reconcile 
economic and innovation policy with sustainable development goals.4 Indeed, not only 
does the diffusion of cleantech promote sustainable development, it can also instigate 
the development of new technologies and new companies with positive ramifications 
for economic growth.  
 In reality, today Finland needs to turn to a new sector in which, as with ICT a 
decade ago, Finnish firms can compete with companies evolving in countries where 
production costs are significantly lower. This entails specialising in a new knowledge-
intensive industry, appropriate for the high-wage society that is Finland. Interestingly, 
the sector of cleantech is such an industry, and there are reasons to believe that 
investing in cleantech is a viable solution for Finland. One observer notes for instance: 
Finland, sobering up after the Nokia frenzy, is looking with a new perspective at the 
resources that no wave of globalisation can take away from the country. Finland will 
continue to safeguard its welfare by means of clean technology.5 
In addition, there is considerable and growing demand for cleantech internationally, and 
this industry therefore has the potential to support growth in a small open economy like 
Finland. In fact, the current rapid growth in cleantech resembles the one witnessed in 
the ICT sector in the late 1990s.	   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In this paper, the information economy refers to an economic system strongly focused on the 
production of ICT, and within which ICT and knowledge play a central role in production. 
4 Cleantech can be understood as referring to ‘all products, services, processes and systems that 
result in fewer harmful impacts on the environment than their alternatives’ (Sitra, 2007: 9). 
5 Quote taken from the Norden website (Heikkilä, 2011: para. 1). 
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 The impressive structural changes Finland achieved in the 1990s have received 
worldwide attention. Castells and Himanen (2002), amongst others, have argued that 
key characteristics of the Finnish society at the time explain Finland’s successful 
transition towards an information economy. Castells and Himanen are the first to 
present the idea of a Finnish ‘model’, the hypothesis that the factors at work in the 
1990s are distinctive enough to be regarded as Finnish attributes. Interestingly, it is 
often claimed that these factors should be emphasised today, as they also have a role to 
play in guaranteeing Finland’s successful economic future. One government report 
judges for example:  
Success in a changing world requires that Finland develop further as a knowledge and 
innovation society which promotes the utilisation and development of its national 
strengths: education and know-how, technology, good governance, equality, a high level 
of environmental protection, and the sustainable use of its natural resources (Ministry of 
the Environment, 2009: 14). 
  Certainly, in its development of cleantech, Finland can utilise the strong national 
innovation system built in the 1990s to support the development of ICT, for example.6 
In fact, there are reasons to believe that some of the key factors that explain Finland’s 
successful specialisation in ICT may be beneficial to the mitigation of climate change, 
and the development of a competitive cleantech industry in Finland today. This thesis 
tests this hypothesis, and seeks to investigate a series of questions in particular: What 
explains the ‘Finnish miracle’ of ICT? Are past attributes of the Finnish society still 
relevant today? Do these characteristics have the potential to help Finland deal with 
the challenges it faces at present? Is this potential fully exploited in practice? 
  The thesis is structured in the following manner. In Chapter I, this paper 
explains the ‘Finnish miracle’ of ICT, Finland’s specialisation in ICT that successfully 
restored economic growth and employment in the late 1990s. The main ambition in this 
section will be to draw on Castells and Himanen (2002) and formulate an interpretation 
of a Finnish societal model. More precisely, in its analysis of the ‘Finnish miracle’ of 
ICT, this paper considers the particular importance of five characteristics of the Finnish 
society at the time: (i) the extensive welfare state, (ii) social cohesion, (iii) effective 
universities, (iv) public-private partnerships, and (v) a favourable policy environment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In this paper, the national innovation system refers to the various actors involved in the 
innovation process in Finland, from the development of an invention to its transformation into a 
marketable product or service. Such actors typically include government agencies, universities 
and research institutions, as well as private companies. 
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In effect, this section provides justification for this paper’s interpretation of a Finnish 
model. 
  In Chapter II, this thesis starts by presenting the current state of the Finnish 
cleantech industry, in an aim to show that some success has already been achieved in 
this area. In this section, the paper also applies its interpretation of a Finnish model to 
present day developments. More precisely, the main ambition in this chapter will be to 
assess the potential role that the five characteristics identified in Chapter I can have in 
Finland’s ongoing effort to participate in the mitigation of climate change. In fact, this 
chapter shows that today, as in the 1990s, the Finnish society is potentially well suited 
for dealing with the challenges it faces. 
  In Chapter III, however, this paper addresses the challenges associated with the 
current climate change mitigation effort in Finland. Four major issues are presented: (i) 
Finland’s climate change mitigation effort has yet to yield clear results, (ii) societal 
support for climate change mitigation is not absolute, (iii) climate change policymaking 
commitments are not clear, and (iv) the climate change mitigation strategy is not 
implemented with full effectiveness. In reality, these issues somewhat challenge 
Finland’s capability to rapidly abate its GHG emissions, and to develop an 
internationally competitive cleantech sector. Associated with each challenge, this paper 
formulates a few key recommendations.  
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Methodology  
 
  
 In this thesis, a model is developed (Chapter I) and tested (Chapter II), and so 
the paper is of both theoretical and empirical nature. In Chapter I, I undertake a 
qualitative case study of the historical event referred to as the ‘Finnish miracle’ of ICT. 
The information for the case study came from both primary (e.g. official reports and 
databases) and secondary (e.g. books and articles) sources available on the topic. 
Economic theory is also used to explain the importance of certain factors. In effect, the 
case study identifies the key factors that explain the economic changes investigated, and 
justifies the paper’s interpretation of Finish societal model. In Chapter II, the model 
presented in Chapter I is applied to a more recent historical period. The aim is to test if 
the characteristics identified in Chapter I are relevant today, and if they still have a role 
to play in helping Finland deal with the issues it faces. The relevance and potential 
influence of the model is justified using both theory and a review of the literature, 
official reports, and data available on the topic. Where appropriate, Finland will also be 
contrasted to other countries, to further emphasise the uniqueness of some of its 
attributes. Responses obtained during interviews are also included in the text, to add 
robustness to the analysis. The feedback obtained thanks to interviews plays a 
particularly important role in Chapter III, where a critical analysis of current 
developments is undertaken. In fact, the identification of the challenges mentioned 
stems from the responses provided by the interviewees. The analysis further relies on 
the results of previously undertaken studies, as well as on official reports assessing the 
state of sustainable development in Finland. 
 In the process of my research, I chose to conduct interviews for two main 
reasons. Firstly, because the reports assessing the ongoing climate change mitigation 
effort are mostly composed by government ministries and public agencies. 
Consequently, it seemed important in my mind to access information also from non-
governmental sources, perhaps evaluating the current situation with more impartiality 
and severity. Secondly, very few published reports assessing the situation are current, 
and so they rarely relate well the effect of climate change mitigation strategies at 
present. The responses I obtained, on the other hand, report the current situation. For 
these reasons, feedback provided by actors currently involved in cleantech and climate 
6	  
change mitigation in Finland was particularly valuable. Interviewees were selected in an 
ambition to obtain responses from actors involved in three different sectors: 
policymaking, business, and civil society. Most interviews were conducted via E-mail 
(in English), and interviewees were sent a number of questions depending on their field 
of expertise. This form of interaction was regarded as the most appropriate when 
contacting Finnish respondents, in light of potential language barriers. One interview 
was conducted face-to-face (in French) on a semi-structured basis, and recorded. 
Responses were then transcribed into writing and translated into English. In total, 
responses from six different interviewees were used in my research. One additional 
respondent redirected me to a testimony he had already written on the issue, as it was 
directly relevant to my questions. Responses from the interviews are directly included in 
the text, as a means of justifying the arguments presented in the thesis. The questions 
asked to each interviewee are included in the appendices.  	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Chapter I. The ‘Finnish miracle’ of ICT and the Finnish model  
 
 
1. The ‘Finnish miracle’ of ICT 
  
 
 In the 1990s, Finland recovered from a severe economic recession and secured 
in its stead rapid GDP and productivity growth. In effect, the increase in productivity 
was mainly achieved through structural change (Ormala, 2001; Benner, 2003; Kiander, 
2004). In the 1990s, Finland shifted away from an economic structure relying on heavy 
industries (machinery, metal products, paper and pulp) towards a knowledge-based 
economy specialised in ICT. By the turn of the century, the electronics industry was the 
largest sector and biggest contributor to exports. ICT share of industrial production had 
grown from 8 percent in 1992 to 27 percent in 2000, and the share of electronics in 
exports increased from 4 percent in 1980 to 35 percent in 2002 (Kiander, 2004: 13). In 
2003, Finland’s ICT sector consisted of six thousand companies and amounted to 10 
percent of Finnish GDP, and Finland produced as much as 7 percent of the world’s 
telecommunications equipment (Rouvinen and Ylä-Anttila, 2004: 87; Kiander, 2004: 
12). In effect, Finland developed in the 1990s from one of the countries the less 
involved in ICT to the country the most specialised in this field, and a world leader in 
high-tech trade (OECD, 2001b).  
 This transition was largely driven by one firm, Nokia, which came to have a 
considerable impact on the development of the Finnish ICT sector and economic 
growth. Nokia’s restructuring and specialisation in ICT in the early 1990s was very 
successful. From 1996 to 2000, net sales grew by about 47 percent per year on average, 
and operating profit rose by nearly 70 percent annually (Nokia, 1997: 3; Nokia, 1998: 2; 
Nokia, 1999: 5; Nokia, 2000: 3). By March 2000, Nokia was the biggest manufacturer 
of mobile phones in the world, occupying over 37 percent of the global market (Cowell, 
2002: para. 5). Meanwhile, Interbrand listed Nokia as the single most valuable European 
brand, and fifth most valuable brand worldwide (Interbrand, 2000). As it developed, 
Nokia was increasingly important for Finland’s economy. By 2000, Nokia accounted for 
70 percent of Finnish ICT exports, 25 percent of total exports, and 75 percent of the 
value of stocks traded on the Helsinki Stock Market (Paija, 2001: 27). Nokia’s fast 
growth in the late 1990s and early 2000s was highly beneficial for the Finnish economy. 
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According to some estimates, at its peak in 2000, Nokia accounted for 1.5-2.5 
percentage points of Finnish GDP growth and for 4 percent of Finnish GDP (Rouvinen 
and Ylä-Anttila, 2004: 92; Ali-Yrkkö, 2010: 11).  
 In turn, growth in the sector of ICT was largely responsible for the growth of the 
economy as a whole in the 1990s.7 Indeed, the ICT sector was the most dynamic sector 
of the economy at the time, and quickly became the most competitive export sector. The 
share of ICT value added grew by nearly 10 percentage points in the 1990s (Kiander, 
2004: 15). In the sector of electronics, labour productivity, capital productivity and total 
factor productivity increased by an annual average of 20.3 percent, 14.9 percent and 
16.7 percent respectively between 1996 and 2000; much faster than in any other sector 
(Junka, 2003: 16). In fact, the sharp rise in total productivity in Finland was for the most 
part attributable to the development of the ICT sector (Daveri and Silva, 2004). By 
being the largest and fastest-growing sector in the late 1990s, ICT had a decisive impact 
on Finland’s economic recovery.	   For this reason, Finnish economic recovery in the 
1990s is often referred to as the ‘Finnish miracle’ of ICT (e.g. Paija, 2001; Benner, 
2003).8 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Other factors include the loosing of exchange rate and monetary policy, the liberalisation of 
capital markets, the abolishment of restrictions on the foreign ownership of Finnish companies, 
and increased openness to trade. 
8 The idea of a ‘miracle’ materialising in Finland is somewhat questioned by the long-term 
picture. Indeed, there are claims that the strong reliance on Nokia and ICT ultimately was 
detrimental to Finland, which was later on hit harder than its neighbours by the crisis in ICT 
(e.g. Pelkonen, 2004). 
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2. The Finnish model 	  	  
 What explains the ‘Finnish miracle’ of ICT? The Finnish specialisation in ICT 
has received worldwide attention and has been the subject of numerous studies. Castells 
and Himanen (2002), for example, looked at the Finnish society at the time in an 
attempt to shed light on Finland’s impressive economic and social changes. In chapter 
seven of their book, Castells and Himanen present their understanding of a ‘Finnish 
model of the information society’. In brief, the authors claim that the most distinctive 
feature of Finland’s switch to an information society is that this transformation was 
combined with a strong and interventionist state. The Finnish state had a double role; it 
was both a ‘developmental state’ and a welfare state. As a ‘developmental state’, it 
supported Finnish firms by installing a supportive regulatory environment and by 
investing in R&D, to their benefit. This rendered the development of ICT possible, and 
the resulting economic growth funded the welfare state. As a welfare state, the Finnish 
state provided crucial societal services, such as free ‘high-quality’ education and 
healthcare, that rendered the switch towards the new economy socially acceptable. 
Castells and Himanen contrast this societal ‘model’ to what they call the ‘Silicon Valley 
Model’ of a market-driven open-information society, and the ‘Singapore Model’ of an 
authoritarian information society (Castells and Himanen, 2002: 18). The ‘Finnish model 
of the information society’, therefore, distinguishes itself by combining an extensive 
and highly democratic welfare state with a dynamic private sector.  
 In the following section, this paper draws on the Castells and Himanen idea of a 
Finnish societal ‘model’. Indeed, like Castells and Himanen (2002), this paper defends 
the hypothesis that some features of the Finnish society have played a key role in the 
economic developments of the 1990s. This paper acknowledges that Castells and 
Himanen’s theories have received some criticism since the publication of their book 
(e.g. Patomäki, 2003; Pelkonen, 2004). The ambition of the following section, however, 
is not to defend the disputed idea of a virtuous cycle at work within the Finnish society, 
but simply to identify the key characteristics that helped Finland be successful in the 
area of ICT. Moreover, instead of following Castells and Himanen’s framework, this 
paper seeks to frame events in a way that they may be used at a later stage to analyse the 
Finnish society today. The aim is therefore to identify a few key and persistent 
characteristics within the Finnish society that could potentially still hold true at present 
10	  
day. This paper agues that together these defining features constitute an interpretation of 
a Finnish model. Here, the Finnish model is defined as one of interaction between three 
main actors: the state, citizens and firms. Figure 1 below illustrates this paper’s 
interpretation of such an interaction within the Finnish society, at the time of the 
‘Finnish miracle’ of ICT.  
Figure 1. The Finnish model  
	  
 
 In its analysis of developments taking place during the ‘Finnish miracle’ of ICT, 
this paper identifies five key Finnish characteristics. In terms of the relationship 
between the state and its citizens, the presence of an extensive welfare state and social 
cohesion are the two defining Finnish characteristics this paper singles out. With respect 
to the interaction between firms and citizens, this paper regards effective universities as 
the key Finnish attribute. By ‘effective’, this paper implies that universities were 
significantly contributing to the public and private sector effort of transiting towards an 
information economy. In this sense, the state has had a further impact on society by 
significantly financing education. Finally, the collaboration between firms and the state 
was conditioned in Finland by public-private partnerships as well as a favourable policy 
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environment. By ‘favourable’, this paper entails that state policies were evidently 
supportive of growth in the sector of ICT. This tri-partite interaction should be seen 
within an international context, and what happens in the rest of the world affects the 
Finnish model. Finnish firms are dependant on foreign markets to sell their products, for 
instance. One should therefore bear in mind that growth in the sector of ICT is not 
solely attributable to developments taking place within Finland. The role played by 
some of these characteristics, such as the welfare state and social cohesion, are 
explicitly mentioned by Castells and Himanen (2002). More broadly, the identification 
of these five features results from an analysis of the ample literature available on the 
‘Finnish miracle’ of ICT, as well as the official reports and data relating the situation at 
the time. These five defining Finnish characteristics are presented and briefly explained 
in Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2. The defining characteristics of the Finnish model 
	  	  
The following section will investigate each of the five characteristics independently, 
and their role in the materialisation of the ‘Finnish miracle’ of ICT. This provides 
justification for this paper’s modeling of the Finnish society at the time.  
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3. The ‘Finnish miracle’ explained in terms of the Finnish model 
 
 
3.1. The extensive welfare state 
 
 
 Finland, alongside the other Scandinavian nations, belongs to the ‘Nordic 
model’ of welfare states. According to this classification, Nordic societies stand out in 
terms of the extensiveness of state intervention into all areas of the life of Nordic 
citizens (Hilson, 2008: 88). Esping-Andersen (1990) characterises Nordic welfare states 
as social-democratic, striving for inclusion and social equality. The distribution of 
welfare services is based on a universalist principle; coverage is linked to citizenship 
rather than based on one’s income. Consequently, Nordic societies are highly egalitarian 
and benefit from very low poverty rates (Kangas and Palme, 2000). The Finnish welfare 
state, in particular, is renowned for its free education, inexpensive health-care services 
and extensive income support. Additionally, the Finnish labour market is supportive of 
full-time work, no matter one’s gender, and renders possible a ‘dual-breadwinner’ 
model in which both parents work (Hilson, 2008). Public investments in childcare 
services are particularly important in this respect. In 2004, for example, Finland 
invested over 1.3 percent of GDP in early childhood education and care, more than any 
other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) country apart 
from Denmark, Sweden and Norway (OECD, 2006: 105). As a result of this ‘dual-
breadwinner’ model, over 77 percent of Finnish women worked in 2000, compared to 
an OECD average of 69 percent (OECD, 2002c: 75). In parallel, the welfare state 
creates public jobs, and the high number of public sector jobs offers a stable source of 
labour demand in Finland, especially for women (Freeman, 1995). Thereby, the Finnish 
welfare state is both a source of labour supply and a source of labour demand.  
 It should be noted that some welfare benefits were cut throughout the 1990s in 
Finland, and there are claims that Finland moved away from a welfare state and towards 
a competition state at the time (e.g. Julkunen, 2001; Pelkonen, 2008).9 Nonetheless, the 
majority of scholars conclude that the austerity reforms had a more quantitative rather 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Entitlements schemes were subject to budgetary constraints in the 1990s, as the Finnish state 
tried to adapt to an open world economy. The real value of employment benefits and old-age 
pensions fell, for instance, as benefits were not adjusted to inflation. Moreover, family support 
programmes and health care subsidies were reduced. On aggregate, social spending (not 
including unemployment-related spending) decreased by about 10 percent in the 1990s 
(Kiander, 2004: 17).  
13	  
than qualitative effect, and that the traditional Finnish welfare system remained intact 
(e.g. Kuhnle, 2000; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Lindbom, 2001). In practice, the Finnish 
welfare state remained throughout the 1990s extensive and very generous. 
Consequently, in Finland increased competitiveness and technological modernisation 
was achieved while keeping levels of social equality very high.10 In fact, in 2000 the 
Finnish Gini coefficient (0.269) was very low and greatly inferior to the one in the USA 
(0.408), for example (World Bank, WDI). Similar conclusions can be drawn in terms of 
the level of social injustice, measured as the ratio of total income received by the 20 
percent of the population with the highest income to that of the 20 percent of the 
population with the lowest income. Finland (3.6) was far more equalitarian than the 
USA (9.0), and than the advanced economies average (5.8) in 2001 (World Bank, 
WDI). Even at the height of the economic crisis, in 1994, the percentage of people 
below the poverty line in Finland (5 percent) was lower than in almost all industrialised 
economies, and Finland still ranked fourth in the Human Poverty Index (HPI-2) in 2001 
(UNDP, 2001: 152).11 In fact, Finland was still at the turn of the century one of the 
countries with the smallest number of poor people in the world, despite having transited 
towards an information economy. Strong social justice was linked to the presence of the 
welfare state, which in this period of economic change redistributed income across 
society, and limited social exclusion through the provision of crucial services (health 
care, education, unemployment benefits, and old-age pensions). The welfare state 
thereby prevented the rise of important inequalities at the time, and this helped Finns 
accept the changes involved.  
 For example, one of the main consequences of the switch towards a knowledge-
based economy was sectoral change in employment. To help with this sectoral shift, the 
Finnish state installed various labour market training programs in the 1990s. The 
number of persons in these programs was highest in 1997, when over one hundred 
thousand individuals (4 percent of the labour force) were placed in labour market 
schemes (Koskela and Uusitalo, 2002: 30). Generally, despite sharp variations in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Income inequalities did in fact rise slightly in Finland in the 1990s (Riihelä et al., 2002). It 
has been argued that this rise was caused by the success of some ICT companies such as Nokia, 
which helped some Finns become very wealthy (Cowell, 2002: para. 19). The rise in 
inequalities was however lesser than in most industrial economies. 
11 The percentage of people below the poverty line (PPP USD 11 per day) in 1994 amounted to 
14 percent in the USA, 10 percent in France, and 7 percent in Germany, for example (UNDP, 
2001: 152). 
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employment rate in the 1990s, the main features of the unemployment insurance system 
remained unchanged and generous. In the 1984-2001 period, unemployment allowances 
actually increased by 9 percent in real terms, for example (Koskela and Uusitalo, 2002: 
19). The maintenance of a generous welfare state helped workers and their unions 
accept the changes on the labour market brought by the switch towards the information 
economy, such as the increase in work flexibility and wage moderation. Typically, 
Finnish labour market institutions are highly corporatist. Finland has one of the world’s 
highest unionisation rates (over 80 percent), and the coverage of collective agreements 
is nearly 100 percent (Kiander, 2004: 22). Employers are also well organised in Finland, 
and what results from this corporatist system is good dialogue and cooperation between 
labour and capital. This was particularly true in Finland in the second half of the 1990s, 
when there was a political consensus to encourage cooperation with labour unions. In 
turn, by encouraging the collaboration between labour and capital, the state rendered the 
development of the ICT sector possible. Indeed, collaboration between both parties has 
rendered the observed long-term wage moderation possible, and subsequent 
improvements in competiveness. More precisely, centralized bargaining twice a year 
involving confederations of trade unions and employers, explains the crucial moderation 
of wages. As a result of the unions’ support, no threats of strikes or other organised 
actions surfaced in the later half of the 1990s. Peaceful industrial relations therefore 
installed a stable environment for business, on top of lower labour costs. In fact, one can 
argue that social pacts have been successful in increasing the productiveness of the 
Finnish economy and the development of the export sector (Benner, 2003). All in all, 
the highly redistributive welfare state in Finland guaranteed the social acceptance of the 
changes occurring in the 1990s, and thereby played a crucial role in the ‘Finnish 
miracle’ of ICT. 
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3.2. Social cohesion 
 
  
 There is in Finland a strong belief in the welfare state, but also much support for 
the state in general. The government usually benefits from high political legitimacy, and 
it was the case in the 1990s when Finland transited towards an information economy. 
The fact that reductions in social expenditure were kept at an acceptable level helped 
maintain social cohesion, and peaceful industrial relations in particular. Public savings 
measures were seen by Finns as necessary to safeguarding the welfare state system in 
place, and were generally well accepted. Support for the welfare state amongst the 
Finnish people actually grew during the 1990s, with about 85 percent of Finns agreeing 
that public services were ‘worth it’ in 2000, against around 60 percent in 1990 (EVA, 
2001). This goes to show that Finns saw the welfare state as beneficial to their living 
standards, and that is why the high taxation regime was tolerated in the country. The 
belief in the welfare state in Finland was also linked to a strong sense of solidarity, in 
turn based on a feeling of national identity and the ethnic homogeneity of the Finnish 
society (Hilson, 2008). Moreover, Finland is a small country with a unique language, 
and for this reason Finns often sees themselves as a minority. This sense of marginality 
has also had a strong impact on Finland’s nation building and nationalist feeling 
(Browning and Lehti, 2007). The strong sense of national identity is probably also 
strengthened by the high level of social homogeneity in Finland. In turn, Finland’s 
recent industrialisation largely explains why Finns usually see themselves as from the 
same social background (Hakli, 1999).  
 The memory of Finland being a small state controlled by foreign powers was 
also still very much alive in the 1990s. Indeed, the history of sovereign Finland is a 
short one, and there were still people alive at the turn of the century that had lived under 
Russian rule. More recently, during the Cold War, Finnish choices were still 
conditioned by the Soviet Union’s interests. This reality is well reflected in Finland’s 
initial decision not to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Hilson, 
2008: 125). Consequently, Finland in the 1990s still had a strong notion of survival, 
which further helped give legitimacy to the state (Dahlman et al., 2006). In fact, the 
development of the information economy was presented and widely seen as a new 
survival project. For example, one official report states:  
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The growth of internationally competitive knowledge-intensive business activities 
offers the only sustainable solution to Finland’s economic problems (Science and 
Technology Policy Council of Finland, 1993: 40).  
 There are also claims that Finland has a tradition of coming together to advance 
a project, perhaps inherited from peasant ideals of collectivism and community (Hilson, 
2008). This may also have played a role in the public’s acceptance of the change 
towards an information economy. Therefore, seen as a protector and the barer of the 
Finnish identity, the Finnish state benefited from high legitimacy. In the absence of a 
legitimacy crisis, the government was allowed to take the bold moves that instigated the 
technological and economic changes in the 1990s. Such measures include wage-
moderation campaigns, and the development of certain specific regions leading to 
geographic disparities. Indeed, legitimacy helps install a stable social environment, as 
citizens are less likely to reject state policies if they trust the government and regard it 
as useful. In fact, there were no strong resistance or opposition movements in Finland. 
There were no popular extreme right or extreme left anti-establishment parties in 
politics, for instance, and not much anti-globalisation resistance either. Finns’ trust in 
their government is also based on the high transparency of political action in Finland, 
which allows citizens to closely monitor policymaking. The relative small size of 
administrations and of the level of bureaucracy within them helps in this respect, as it 
becomes more difficult to get away with individual corruption or misbehaviour in 
general (Dahlman et al., 2006).  
 Moreover, Finland could be seen in the early 1990s as a young country looking 
towards the future, and Finns were still looking for an identity and some international 
recognition. Becoming a world leader and expert in an area was an important step 
towards this goal, and many Finns take pride in the success of Finnish ICT (Alho, 2002: 
para. 3). The information economy bore new identity, with the potential to change 
Finland’s international image of a small agricultural state. The fact that Finland 
perceived itself as a young nation also somewhat rendered Finns less sceptic towards 
changing old ways, and opting for a way of life strongly conditioned by technology. 
Consequently, in the 1990s Finns showed positive attitudes towards new technologies 
(Miettinen, 2002). Since the beginning of the 1990s, Finland has led Internet statistics in 
terms of the number of hosts per capita (two hundred per thousand population) and the 
number of Internet users as a share of the population (46 percent), for instance (UNDP, 
2001: 60). It also had by 1999 the highest penetration rate of mobile phones in the 
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world, and roughly 65 percent of the Finnish population owned a mobile phone that 
year (UNDP, 2001: 60).12 Finland also benefited early on from significant business use 
of ICT, and the diffusion of ICT to Finnish firms was far greater in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s than the OECD countries average (OECD, 2004: 122). The WEF, for 
instance, ranked Finland eleventh out of over a hundred countries in terms of the degree 
of business usage of ICT in 2003 (WEF, 2003). One study further revealed that in 
Finland a larger proportion of companies used ICT systems for orders and purchases in 
2003 than in any other EU country (OECD, 2004: 127). Additionally, a 2003 survey 
showed that 94 percent of Finnish firms used Internet in their daily business, and 59 
percent had a home page (Statistics Finland, 2003). Having a small and homogenous 
population can be an asset for the fast diffusion of new knowledge, such as the 
understanding of ICT (Rouvinen and Ylä-Anttila, 2004). Conversely, the diffusion of 
personal computers (PCs) and Internet throughout society was a must for the formation 
of a knowledge-based economy (Dahlman et al., 2006: 82). Social cohesion, and in 
particular the willingness of Finns to embrace ICT and support their production, 
therefore helped Finland switch rapidly towards an information economy.	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In Finland, the users themselves helped drive innovations. It was the case with text messaging 
for instance, an innovation Nokia originally thought would be dedicated to sending very short 
and urgent messages. Consumers found a further use to it, and started adopting text messages as 
forms of communication alternative to calls. This habit then spread to the rest of the world, and 
innovations in text messaging quickly followed. 
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3.3. Effective universities 
 
 
 The importance of having an educated population for economic growth was 
realised early on in Finland, and there is a strong emphasis on education since the 1960s 
in the country (Dahlman et al., 2006: 56). Between 1958 and 1979 alone, as much as 
eight new universities were established. More recently, spending on education has risen 
sharply in the 1990s. By 1997, public spending on education amounted to 6.2 percent of 
Finnish GDP, above the OECD average of 5.8 percent (Ministry of Education, 2000: 
17; OECD, 2000: 42). In fact, 13 percent of Finnish government expenditure in 1999 
was dedicated to education, and 23 percent of this spending was attributed to university 
education and research in particular (Ministry of Education, 2000: 16). Correlated with 
spending, the number of Finnish graduates was exceptionally high. Indeed, the primary, 
secondary, and tertiary combined enrolment ratio of 103 in 2001 was impressive. In 
comparison, this ratio was 95 in the USA and 94 for the advanced economies average 
that year (UNDP, 2003: 270). The number of students in Finnish universities increased 
from about one hundred fifteen thousand in 1991 to one hundred fifty thousand in 1999 
(Ministry of Education, 2000: 20). In fact, in 2000, 83 percent of Finns aged twenty-five 
to thirty-four had completed at least an upper-secondary degree. This constituted a 
significant increase, as only 37 percent of Finns aged fifty-five to sixty-four were in 
possession of such a degree that year (Ministry of Education, 2000: 15). The number of 
awarded Master’s and Doctorate degrees had risen particularly fast, roughly doubling 
and quadrupling respectively between 1981 and 1999 (Ministry of Education, 2000: 
34). One reason explaining these high numbers is the inexpensiveness of education in 
Finland, which is heavily subsidized by the state in an ambition of equality. Universities 
are state-owned and, with the exception of certain specific programs, students do not 
pay tuitions fees. The fact that universities are free is helpful in itself, as it removes 
some financial pressure on students who can dedicate more time to academic projects, 
and after graduation start working with very little debt to constrain their options. 
 Moreover, in the 1990s education in Finland had a particular focus on science 
and engineering. Science, mathematics and engineering students amounted to 37 
percent of all tertiary students in Finland in 1997, compared to 20 percent in the USA 
for example (UNDP, 2001: 174). In fact, this share was one of the highest in the world. 
The Finnish strong suit in sciences applied to secondary education as well, and the 2000 
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Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) study ranked Finland third 
amongst OECD nations in terms of scientific literacy, and fourth in terms of mathematic 
literacy (OECD, 2002a: 74-77). The production of ICT requires highly educated 
workers and researchers, and the availability of such a workforce was a crucial factor in 
Finland’s success in ICT (Dahlman et al., 2006). The Finnish focus on science and 
engineering was particularly helpful for firms in the growing ICT sector in the 1990s. In 
fact, in the 1990s universities responded to firms’ need for ICT graduates. While in 
1993 universities and polytechnics let in some three thousand four hundred new 
students in ICT-related programs, around seven thousand seven hundred new students 
were admitted in such degrees in 1998 (Dahlman et al., 2006: 62).  
 Polytechnics were established in the 1990s, and now constitute alongside 
universities one of the two branches of the Finnish higher education sector. More 
precisely, twenty-nine polytechnics were formed in that decade, increasing the technical 
and professional emphasis of Finnish graduate education (Ministry of Education, 2000: 
15). Between 1997 and 1999 alone, the number of students studying in polytechnics 
rose from about fifty thousand to eighty thousand, and more students entered the 
‘Technology and Transfer’ programs in polytechnics than any other branch (Ministry of 
Education, 2000: 20; 42). Open university courses were also made available to adults, 
and thereby offered training opportunities for workers already on the job market. The 
number of students in open-university programs rose from about sixty thousand in 
1991, to about one hundred thirty thousand in 1999 (Ministry of Education, 2000: 38). 
The higher education system was thereby used by the state in its plan to educate the 
population and upgrade Finland’s innovative capacity. Moreover, in the late 1990s the 
state implemented new education strategies aimed at further developing the skills and 
infrastructures needed for the information economy (Ministry of Education, 2000: 25). 
For example, in 2001 Finnish universities jointly launched the Finnish Virtual 
University. Such forms of online teaching constitute good examples of the use of ICT in 
the Finnish education system. Therefore, universities were also a medium via which 
students were exposed to ICT, and education in Finland thereby affected the demand for 
ICT innovations alongside their supply. 
 In a knowledge-based economy, universities play a role comparable to that of 
industry and the government as a source of innovation (Etzkowitz, 2003). Modern 
‘entrepreneurial’ universities often conduct research that has direct industrial 
applications, and even become involved in entrepreneurial activity and the creation of 
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enterprises. More precisely, Etzkowitz’s Triple Helix model illustrates the benefit of 
cooperation at the local level between universities (producers of knowledge), the 
industry (markets) and public entities (support and funding) (Etzkowitz, 2003). One can 
argue that Finnish universities have networked more and more with the private sector, 
and gradually endorsed an ‘entrepreneurial’ role (Pelkonen, 2008). In fact, increasing 
the overall R&D capacity of universities and polytechnics was seen as a priority in 
Finland. The research expenditure of universities was already quite high in 1999, 
amounting to over one billion Finnish Marks (Ministry of Education, 2000: 47). The 
most significant fields of university research were technology and the natural sciences, 
receiving nearly half of the research funding. Universities where therefore places were 
significant publicly funded R&D took place, and the Helsinki University of 
Technology, the Tampere University of Technology, and the University of Oulu in 
particular were the most important centres of public technology research in the 1990s. 
By 2001, Finland ranked first in the world in terms of the number of researchers as a 
share of the total workforce (Dahlman et al., 2006: 16). This is largely attributable to the 
role of universities, which both acted as public research institutions and a source of 
researchers for the private sector.  
 Universities in Finland were also in close contact with private companies. In 
fact, more than half (53 percent) of Finnish companies had some form of collaboration 
agreement with national universities in the 1994-6 period, a far greater share than the 
EU average of 7.5 percent (European Commission, 1996). Networking with the private 
sector and public institutions has been reflected in the rising importance of external 
sources of funding in education since the early 1990s. By the early 2000s, roughly 35 
percent of university expenditures were covered by external funding sources (Ministry 
of Education and culture, KOTA). ICT products are strongly derived from a scientific 
base, and that is why companies in this sector were dependent on university research. 
Conversely, networking with the private sector increases the industrial applicability of 
university research, and therefore the potential benefits of R&D for the economy. 
Nokia, for example, extensively networked with universities, which had the task of 
conducting its basic research. Nokia’s radio-technologies division, for instance, was 
developed in close collaboration with the Helsinki University of Technology. Nokia is 
therefore a good example of how private firms at the time shaped university research 
and knowledge from public institutions into marketable products, thanks to their 
available funds (Ali-Yrkkö, 2010: 20). All in all, Finnish universities played a 
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significant role in the ‘Finnish miracle’ of ICT. By impacting available skills, the 
research focus, and citizen behaviours (exposure to ICT), higher education institutions 
(HEIs) effectively supported the public and private sector project that was the switch 
towards the information economy.  	  	  
3.4. Public-private partnerships 
 
 
 In Finland, a strategy of collaboration between various actors from the public 
and private sectors was initiated in the context of the specialization in ICT. The 
economic literature shows that developing and commercialising new technologies is 
uncertain and risky, and so private companies that seek to do so require assistance from 
the public sector (e.g. Armstrong, 2000). Indeed, capital markets are unlikely to invest 
in new technology projects until there is some assurance that these projects will bring 
sufficient returns. The unattractiveness of new technologies for investors is often 
explained by the ‘lock-in’ of incumbent technologies, the fact that new technologies are 
initially uncompetitive as compared to existing products and processes (Arthur, 1989). 
This is especially true since the initial fixed investment costs tend to be high, and there 
often lacks clear demand opportunities at the start. In turn, the shortage of funding may 
result in an innovation being stuck in the so-called valley of death, the particularly 
uncertain and costly phase between demonstration and commercialisation. Start-ups, 
common in the field of ICT, suffer from an exceptionally problematic lack of private-
investments as the relative riskiness of investing in start-ups is particularly high. State 
financial assistance is one way to mitigate these market failures and encourage firms to 
undertake research, development and innovation (R&D&I) in new technological fields. 
The literature further shows that collaboration in research is likely to result in more 
innovation (e.g. D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). Such cooperation typically 
involves the sharing of information and costs associated with R&D. Collaboration may 
be useful due to its potential for risk sharing, the elimination of research duplication and 
overcoming the imperfect appropriability of R&D issue.13 In the sector of ICT, 
exploiting spillovers through cooperation may be particularly important, as they tend to 
incite technical progress more than in other sectors (Spence, 1984; Levin, 1988).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Imperfect appropriability refers to the reality that firms typically cannot capture the full social 
returns of their R&D&I (Arrow, 1962). 
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 In the 1990s, the Finnish state realised that instigating innovation in the ICT 
sector would require the implementation of public-private partnerships (PPPs), which 
most frequently involved providing assistance to firms in their R&D effort (Dahlman et 
al., 2006).14 Tekes, the Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation, has been the main 
source of business-focused R&D finance since its creation in 1983.15 In fact, Tekes 
funded all successful Finnish ICT firms at some stage of their expansion. Typically, 
firms in Finland can qualify for Tekes R&D funding only if they collaborate in their 
project with other companies or research institutions. The state thereby further 
encourages collaboration in R&D. In fact, in 2003 Finland had the greatest share of 
industrial SMEs involved in R&D collaboration amongst European countries (European 
Commission, 2004). Tekes also designed technology programs in collaboration with 
industry and universities, with the aim of signalling the need for new R&D ventures. In 
addition, Sitra, the Finnish Innovation Fund, provided funding for start-up companies in 
the early stages of their development.16 In effect, Sitra was the largest venture capitalist 
in Finland, and also acted as a think tank in bringing about the formation of new ideas. 
Finally, Finnvera, a state-owned funding agency run by the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy, and Finpro, the Finnish National Agency for Corporate 
Internationalisation, have also been important funding institutions for firms in recent 
years. They provide financial assistance for SME operations, with a particular focus on 
the internationalization of Finnish firms.  
 A big part of Nokia’s success, for instance, can be attributed to its collaboration 
with public sector entities. Indeed, Nokia’s conversion to ICT was undertaken in close 
collaboration with public entities such as Tekes, which developed programs to help 
Nokia grow (Dahlman et al., 2006). Nokia also directly benefited from Tekes R&D 
financing. In fact, in 1980 over one quarter of Nokia’s R&D was financed by Tekes, 
although this figure dropped to 1.5 percent on average in the 1990s as the company 
grew (Ali-Yrkkö, 2010: 24-25). In terms of the number of projects funded, Tekes 
support was greatest in the early 1990s, and an average of forty-five Nokia projects 
received funding annually between 1991 and 1995 (Ali-Yrkkö, 2010: 27). In reality, 
Tekes support allowed Nokia to sustain its research activity in spite of the economic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 By public-private partnership, this paper means here the networking and collaboration 
between public and private sector actors in the undertaking of particular projects. 
15 Tekes answers to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, although it is independent in 
its allocation of R&D funding. 
16 Sitra answers to the Finnish Parliament but, just like Tekes, enjoys an autonomous status. 
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crisis (Häikiö, 2001). Nokia also significantly benefited from cooperation with 
authorities in the context of the Nordisk Mobil Telefon (Nordic Mobile Telephone, 
NMT) standard, which allowed Nokia to get a head start on the market for NTM and 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) handsets. 
 The Finnish state further sought to encourage public-private partnerships 
through the special clustering of actors. In 1993, the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(now Ministry of Employment and the Economy) released the National Industrial White 
Paper, which aimed to intensify the focus of industrial policy towards the clustering of 
important activities (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1993). In parallel, the Academy of 
Finland established in 1993 the first seventeen Centres of Excellence (CoEs) (Academy 
of Finland, 1993). CoEs, and the clustering of industrial activity in general, can be seen 
as a corporatist approach to generating innovation, where public and private sector 
actors are encouraged to collaborate in close proximity. CoEs were jointly financed by 
the Academy of Finland, universities, private companies, public agencies and even the 
EU. They typically regroup a large number of researchers who conduct applied and 
basic research, potentially useful to industry and society. These clusters are places of 
collaboration between firms and universities, and amongst firms themselves. Actually, 
clusters were usually formed around technology-focused universities (Pelkonen, 2008: 
80). According to Etzkowitz (2003), such collaboration is beneficial for innovation, as 
mentioned previously. In particular, the Centres of Expertise Programme (OSKE) was 
launched to provide funds to regional clusters of firms, research centres and science 
parks. The aim was to explore more efficiently new domains in science and technology 
with likely industrial applicability and for which networking was crucial. The public 
sector intervened within clusters by providing firm-level funding for R&D activity, 
access to relevant technological infrastructure, on top of increasing the supply of ICT 
graduates.  
 A defining characteristic of Finnish ICT policy in the 1990s was also the 
importance of collaborative committees, which facilitated networking between private 
and public sectors. One example of such commissions is the Committee for Computer 
Policy, created in 1972. Such committees are typically composed of representatives of 
industry, state administrations, academia, and trade unions, for instance. Collaborative 
committees allow for concerted policymaking, with diverse stakeholders having some 
impact on the process, and the extent of networking in Finland has been regarded as a 
significant advantage in its industrial upgrading (Rouvinen and Ylä-Anttila, 2004). In 
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effect, collaboration between public institutions and private firms was exceptional in 
Finland in the 1990s, and state support significantly explains why private companies 
emerged and grew in the new sector of ICT. For this reason, this paper identifies PPPs 
as a Finnish characteristic, and one that played a key role in the ‘Finnish miracle’ of 
ICT.  
 
 
3.5. A favourable policy environment  
 
 
 In the 1990s, the Finnish state acted as a promoter of technological innovation. 
Through the combination of deregulation and state intervention in key areas, the state 
assembled the conditions for the competiveness of Finnish firms and the successful 
development of ICT. This favourable policy environment was a result of a political 
consensus to upgrade the Finnish science base and enhance technological capabilities 
(Rouvinen and Ylä-Anttila, 2004). In terms of policymaking’s role in the Finnish 
innovation system, a few actors were particularly important. The Science and 
Technology Policy Council (now Research and Innovation Council), established in 
1987, oversaw science and technology policy in Finland. In effect, the Science and 
Technology Policy Council was the main actor in terms of the national innovation 
strategy, deciding public R&D investments throughout the 1990s, as well as 
encouraging the establishment of a regulatory environment favourable to innovation. It 
thereby played a central role in Finland’s structural changes towards a knowledge-based 
economy (Benner, 2003: 136). This council was constituted of diverse stakeholders, 
namely key representatives of universities, industry stakeholders, the Academy of 
Finland, Tekes, and labour organisations. The Science and Technology Policy Council 
also comprised of representatives from eight ministries, and its meetings were chaired 
by the Prime Minister. Key policymakers were therefore also directly involved in this 
entity, which allowed for the cooperation between diverse stakeholders in the forming 
of innovation policy. In addition, the Academy of Finland, administered by the Ministry 
of Education (now Ministry of Education and Culture), formulates science policy and is 
the main agency responsible for the allocation of funds for scientific research in 
Finland. In 1969, the Academy was reformed and it changed from a community of 
academics to its modern role as a funding agency for science. With respect to ICT, 
Telectronics was one project funded by the Academy, receiving nearly EUR 8 million 
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between 1998 and 2003 (Dahlman et al., 2006: 59). These two institutions constitute the 
core instruments for Finnish policymaking in the area of science and technology.  	   The Finnish state played a crucial part in the ‘Finnish miracle’ of ICT by 
installing a business environment favourable to innovation and competitiveness. This 
largely involved instigating a trend of liberalization and privatization in the ICT 
industry. In the Finnish strategy, an important role was therefore left to market forces, 
and the state refrained from heavy regulation. In practice, the government’s role was 
limited to creating favourable conditions for private companies to act in markets 
(Pursiainen, 2003). In comparison to its European neighbours, Finland liberalized its 
telecommunications sector early on, for example. The major market liberalisation 
policies were indeed implemented between 1987 and 1994. These include the 
introduction of competition in corporate networks and data transmission (1987), as well 
as in data networks and mobile phone networks (1990). Regional, national, and 
international telecommunications services were also liberalized in 1994. Liberalization 
has allowed for more entry on the market, mainly thanks to the loosening of heavy 
license conditions, and, by the turn of the century, there were about 50 operators in 
Finland (Pelkonen, 2004). In fact, Finland was the first country in the world to have a 
private mobile phone operator. By liberalising key industries and privatising companies, 
the Finnish state shifted knowledge from the public sector to the private sector and 
improved economic efficiency. For example, Nokia acquired Telefenno and Salora in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, joint ventures it had developed with private competitors 
as well as a public company. As a result of these mergers, encouraged by the state, 
Nokia significantly increased its expertise in telecommunications and its share of the 
market. The early liberalisation of the ICT infrastructure also played an important role 
in the rapid proliferation of ICT products within the Finnish society. Indeed, a market 
with various operators in competition helped fuel innovation, efficiency, and low prices 
(Rouvinen and Ylä-Anttila, 2004). In fact, the early liberalisation of the 
telecommunications industry is often seen as a significant determinant of the ‘Finnish 
miracle’ in ICT, alongside the arrival of digital technologies (Pursiainen, 2003). The 
state also liberalised capital markets and trade, thereby helping Finnish firms access 
more funds and consumer markets. Generally, state intervention can be described as 
having provided incentives that complemented market mechanisms, not replaced them.  
 The Finnish state further played a part in the ‘Finnish miracle’ by extensively 
funding R&D in the area of ICT. The economic literature shows that the government 
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must step in and invest in R&D for projects that are too costly or risky for private-sector 
investment alone (OECD, 2010). The high-tech sectors are particularly subject to an 
R&D underinvestment problem (Galai and Wiener, 2003). The literature also shows that 
government R&D spending is further beneficial as it tends to bring about additional 
private R&D investments and resulting innovation (Goldberg, 1979). Finland adopted 
early on an innovation funding policy approach, and subsequently established the 
needed institutions to support such an ambition. Unlike in many other OECD countries, 
the Finnish state chose not to grant tax incentives for R&D and instead directly 
subsidised this activity. In Finland, in the 1980s and 1990s, industrial R&D expenditure 
grew faster than in any other OECD country. In 1982, the state committed itself to 
nearly doubling national R&D expenditure, from 1.2 percent of GDP to 2.2 percent of 
GDP by 1992.17 This goal was just about reached, and more ambitious targets were set 
despite the economic recession.18 A significant increase in R&D expenditure was 
further decided in 1995, when an innovation package of 3,200 million Finnish Marks 
was invested in R&D (Benner, 2003: 136). These funds were distributed amongst three 
main channels: CoEs and universities, industrial clusters, and regional innovation 
systems. As a result, Finnish R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP rose to 2.5 
percent in 1996, 2.9 percent in 1998, and by 2000 it amounted to 3.3 percent of GDP 
(World Bank, WDI).  
 Moreover, the ICT sector was the recipient of more public funding than any 
other field of technology during the final two decades of the 20th century. Tekes, for 
example, dedicated approximately 25 percent of its funding to ICT in the 1990s 
(Pursiainen, 2003: 15). In the 1997-2002 period, aggregate spending on ICT by all 
government ministries and the Cabinet Office increased by about 57 percent, from EUR 
340 million to EUR 535 million approximately (Dahlman et al., 2006: 31). Gradually, 
as the ICT sector developed, the emphasis shifted towards encouraging knowledge 
creation within companies and universities, instead of directly involving the public 
sector. This is well reflected in the falling share of public R&D spending in total 
expenditure, as the level of private R&D investments rose throughout the 1990s. 
Indeed, in 1999 private sector R&D represented 69 percent of total R&D, up from 57 
percent in 1991 (Prihti et al., 2000: 80). In effect, the Finnish government in the late 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Decision-in-principle of the Council of State 727/140/82 VNK. 
18 Finnish R&D expenditure is estimated to have amounted in 1992 to 2.1 percent of GDP 
(Eurostat). 
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1990s intervened to instigate the switch towards a new economic structure, while at the 
same time installed a deregulated environment beneficial to the growth of private firms. 
Finland therefore balanced state intervention with private-sector competiveness, with 
rare success. By the turn of the century, the results of continued public R&D 
investments and the liberalisation trend were clearly reflected in the performance of the 
Finnish ICT sector, and the subsequent structural change of Finnish industry and 
exports. By then, the ICT industry had become the largest and most competitive sector 
in Finland. 
  
 In conclusion, this chapter argued that five factors have played a key role in the 
rapid development of the ICT sector in the 1990s: the presence of an extensive welfare 
state, a cohesive society, universities effectively contributing to the public and private 
sector effort, public-private partnerships instigating innovation and growth, as well as a 
policy environment favourable to the development of the ICT sector. Although these 
five features may be found in other societies, this paper finds their influence at the time 
to be unique enough to constitute Finnish characteristics, and jointly justify an 
interpretation of a Finnish model. Today, as in the early 1990s, Finland is again dealing 
with an economic downturn partially caused by industrial decline, and the state is 
looking for a new sector with the capacity to restore Finland’s competiveness.  
Additionally, Finland is faced with the necessity to reduce its GHG emissions in light of 
its commitments to participate in the mitigation of global warming. The next section 
seeks to investigate whether the five characteristics presented in this chapter are still 
relevant today, and if they have the potential to benefit Finland with respect to the two 
challenges just mentioned. 	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Chapter II. Climate change mitigation: the Finnish model today 
 
 
1. The current climate change mitigation strategy and economic 
implications 
 
 
 Finland’s climate change policy is derived from the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, as well as EU-wide 
agreements such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and the EU Climate 
and Energy Package.19 The Kyoto Protocol initially required the EU to decrease by 8 
percent its GHG emissions in the 2008-2012 period, as compared to the 1990 level. 
Finland has fulfilled this particular commitment, and its emissions in 2011 were 
actually below the required reduction amount by 5 percent (Ministry of the 
Environment and Statistics Finland, 2013: 93). For the second commitment period, the 
EU has committed itself to decreasing its GHG emissions by 20 percent by 2020, as 
compared to the 1990 concentration. Accordingly, Finland is required to decrease its 
emissions in sectors not included in the EU ETS (waste, transport, infrastructures, and 
agriculture) by 16 percent as compared to 2005. Additionally, the Climate and Energy 
Package asks Finland to increase to 38 percent its share of energy produced from 
renewable energy sources (renewables), by 2020. Recently, Finland has shown its 
commitment to the EU project by embarking in 2009 on a strategy to reduce by 2050 its 
GHG emissions by at least 80 percent, as compared to the 1990 level.20  
 Finland’s climate change mitigation effort can yield significant economic 
benefits in the short-term, through the development of a competitive environmental 
business sector in the country. The cleantech industry is a very promising sector, 
already contributing to economic growth in Finland and globally. Internationally, the 
cleantech market was worth EUR 1,600 billion in 2011, or 6 percent of global GDP 
approximately, and benefited from a 10-percent annual growth rate (Motiva, 2014: 11). 
In effect, the cleantech sector has grown extremely fast in the last few years. Indeed, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Finland’s commitments and the implementation of the climate change strategy are approved 
by the Finnish Parliament. In turn, the Ministry of Employment and the Economy is in charge of 
coordinating Finland’s climate change strategy, while the Ministry of the Environment deals 
with the administrative side of negotiations and agreements.  
20 Foresight Report on Long-term Climate and Energy Policy (October 2009). 
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2007 the global turnover for environmental business still amounted to EUR 600 billion 
only, and to EUR 4.5 billion in Finland (Sitra, 2010: 7; 12). Moreover, environmental 
business is expected to grow even faster in the near future, and to amount to EUR 3,000 
billion globally by 2020, and USD 7,400 billion by 2025 (Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy, 2013: 11; Helmut Kaiser Consultancy, 2009: para. 3). The combined 
turnover of cleantech in Finland was EUR 24.6 billion in 2012, and with its 15-percent 
annual growth rate, cleantech was one of the fastest growing sectors in the Finnish 
economy. The turnover for 2013 has certainly been even larger, forecasted at EUR 25.6 
billion (Cleantech Finland and Burson-Marsteller, 2013). In Finland more than 2,000 
firms already operated in the cleantech sector in 2011. In fact, Finland is ranked fourth 
in the 2012 Global Cleantech Innovation Index, after Denmark, Israel and Sweden 
(Cleantech Group and WWF, 2012).21 In particular, Finland is ranked second in both 
overall innovation drivers and cleantech innovation drivers. In addition, Finland 
achieved a top score in the area of public R&D, and a high score in the field of 
emerging cleantech innovation, thanks to good venture capital funding and coverage of 
environmental patents. Most of the demand for cleantech is coming from developing 
economies, and this demand will only increase in the future. There is therefore already a 
considerable market for cleantech products, and significant export opportunities even 
for a small country like Finland. Consequently, many stakeholders in Finland are 
optimistic as to the state of the national cleantech sector, and its future. It is the case of 
the following three people I contacted on the matter: 
At the moment, the Finnish industry is going through changes. The traditional heavy 
industries (mainly the paper industry) are going down and now we need to find some new 
businesses. That’s where we have a great chance to change the industry towards less 
energy consuming, greener trades. We also have a great potential to innovate and develop 
emission-free energy sources (biomass, solar, and wind). 
Liisa Selvenius-Hurme, chairperson of the NGO Ilmastovanhemmat (Climate Parents). 
Finland already is a leader in cleantech. We rank in the top 3 or 5 in most cleantech 
studies, and last year the revenue for the sector increased by 15 percent while the overall 
economy contracted. We can and must do even better, however. Renewable energy 
sources can be developed quickly enough [for them to become a credible substitute to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 In the context of this study, ‘thirty-eight countries were evaluated on 15 indicators related to 
the creation and commercialisation of cleantech start-ups, generating an index measuring each 
one’s potential, relative to their economic size, to produce entrepreneurial cleantech start-up 
companies and commercialise clean technology innovations over the next 10 years’ (Cleantech 
Group, 2012: para. 2). 	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fossil fuels in the short term]. The limitations are not technical and not so much even 
economical as they are political. 
Oras Tynkkynen, member of the Finnish Parliament (Green League) and former Advisor to 
Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen on Climate Policy. 
I am hopeful as to the future of the Finnish cleantech sector. I hope that the Cleantech 
sector along with ICT will give Finland new growth, and hopefully Finland will become 
“a world leader” or be at the top of those. Finland has good strength and history in these 
sectors, and the state is doing a lot. Tekes is the main agency for this job. We have a 
Cleantech Finland programme, etc. 
Timo Ritonummi, Deputy Director General, Head of Energy Efficiency and Growth Group, 
Energy Department, Ministry of Employment and the Economy. 
 Cleantech Finland published in May 2013 its 4th annual survey of the Finnish 
cleantech industry, covering 115 Finnish cleantech firms. The survey finds that the 
cleantech sector already has a significant weight in the Finnish economy. Indeed, 
cleantech companies accounted for a share of total turnover of 77 percent in 2013, and 
this share is as high as 86 percent when considering small companies in particular 
(Cleantech Finland and Burson-Marsteller, 2013). In fact, cleantech was the third 
largest sector in 2012, after ICT and forestry, and is possibly the second largest sector at 
present day. It was also the second fastest growing sector in 2012, after the gaming 
industry. The few companies that operate on international markets are the drivers of the 
Finnish environmental business sector. Indeed, export markets are crucial for Finnish 
cleantech firms, and 61 percent of firms interviewed claimed that most of their turnover 
was gained abroad. In fact, Finnish cleantech exports amounted to EUR 12 billion in 
2012, about 20 percent of aggregate Finnish exports (Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy, 2012: 2). The three biggest Finnish cleantech firms in 2013 were Wärtsilä 
(engineering and consulting), Metso (processing technologies and services) and Neste 
Oil (oil refining).22 There are a number of other Finnish cleantech firms amongst the 
leaders in their fields, including Pöry (engineering and consulting), Kuusakoski 
(recycling services), Outotec (processing technologies), Kemira (chemicals), YIT 
(construction), Moventas (wind power), AW-Energy (wave power) and BMH 
Technology (waste management).  
 Most Finnish cleantech firms are involved in the area of energy efficiency (59 
percent), with renewable energy (48 percent) also constituting a key area of expertise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Metso employs 16,000 people in 50 countries, with net sales in 2013 amounting to EUR 3,9 
billion (Metso, 2013: para. 3). Neste Oil net sales were EUR 17.5 billion in 2013, and the 
company employs approximately 5,000 people worldwide (Neste Oil, 2013: para. 1). In 2013, 
Wärtsilä’s net sales were EUR 4.7 billion, and it employed 18,700 employees in 70 countries 
that year (Wärtsilä, 2013: para. 2). 
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for Finnish firms (Cleantech Finland and Burson-Marsteller, 2013). About a third also 
indicated to be involved in waste management and recycling, and in the area of clean 
processes, materials and products. Consequently, a large share of the industry’s turnover 
comes from the areas of energy efficiency (36 percent) and clean processes, materials 
and products (31 percent) (Cleantech Finland and Burson-Marsteller, 2013). 
Historically, the Finnish industrial structure has relied on energy intensive industries, 
and this explains why the Finnish industry has long sought to develop solutions to limit 
energy use and the production of waste. Moreover, the forest industry has been a key 
industry in Finland for over a hundred years, and Finland now has the most advanced 
harvesting logistics chain internationally. Finland is therefore well suited for the 
exploitation of biomass, and its transformation into biofuels (biorefining). Demand 
exists as well, as biofuels can be used within the existing system. Biomass is 
consequently the main source of renewable energy in Finland currently, and three 
leading Finnish forestry companies, UPM, Stora Enso, and Metsä Group, have become 
international leaders in bioenergy and sustainable forest products. 
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2. The Finnish model today 
 
 
 Is the Finnish society well suited to deal with the challenges it faces at present, 
in light of attributes that had proven helpful in the past? Early signs of success indicate 
that Finland has the potential to develop a competitive cleantech sector, and rally 
society behind the mitigation of climate change. Interestingly, the emergence of a new 
industrial sector, as well as the mitigation of carbon emissions, requires changes across 
the entire society. As with the emergence of ICT, change must be instigated by the sate 
in the form of regulations and incentives, and in turn citizens must adapt to these 
changes. One government report acknowledges for instance: 
Thanks to high levels of know-how, Finland has an excellent opportunity to take a 
leading role in the rapidly growing field of environmental business development. 
However, this will require the same degrees of effort and unanimous support from society 
as a whole that earlier helped to boost Finland’s ICT-industry (Sitra, 2007: 11). 
The high quality research and innovation system in the country, and the significant 
Finnish know-how in the science and technology fields, could indeed be valuable assets 
for Finland. In fact, there are reasons to believe that the key characteristics that helped 
instigate the ‘Finnish miracle’ of ICT may be beneficial to the abatement of climate 
change, and the development of a cleantech industry in Finland. For this reason, it is 
interesting to apply the interpretation of a Finnish societal model, presented previously 
in the paper in relation to ICT, to the situation today with respect to the Finnish climate 
change mitigation effort. Such application of the Finnish model is visualised in Figure 3 
below. 	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Figure 3: The Finnish model today 
	  	  	  
In its analysis of ongoing climate mitigation efforts, this paper investigates the potential 
role of the five Finnish characteristics presented in the previous chapter. These five 
defining Finnish characteristics, and their potential influence today, are presented in 
Figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4: The defining characteristics of the Finnish model today 
	  
  
 
In the following section, the potential for the five characteristics to benefit Finland in its 
emissions abatement effort is explained in greater detail. The aim here is not to defend 
the idea that Finland is already doing everything right, or that Finland can mitigate its 
GHG emissions without cost. Clearly, both of these statements are incorrect. The next 
section simply seeks to outline how key features within the Finnish society can be 
beneficial in terms of dealing with the issue at hand.  
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3. The Finnish model and the mitigation of climate change 
 
 
3.1. The extensive welfare state 
 
 
 This paper argued in Chapter I that the welfare state in Finland is extensive, and 
that it played a crucial supportive role in the 1990s when Finland went through 
important economic and social changes. The aim of such a welfare state is to protect 
citizens from economic and social hardships, and to promote greater income equality 
through the redistribution of earnings. There is evidence within the literature that this 
form of state intervention could be beneficial for the mitigation of global warming. 
With regards to the link between income equality and carbon emissions, Wilkinson and 
Pickett (2010) offer interesting hypotheses. Their work is surely the most 
comprehensive undertaken on the topic so far, and their findings are often used to 
demonstrate that greater equality could be helpful for the abatement of GHG emissions. 
It should be noted, however, that the book has received some criticism. Simic (2012), 
for instance, identifies problematic flaws concerning Wilkinson and Pickett’s choice of 
data and their econometric analyses. Moreover, not all of Wilkinson and Pickett’s 
(2010) arguments are fully convincing. For instance, the authors reach the conclusion 
that more equalitarian societies are more innovative, after conducting a linear regression 
analysis. However, the number of ‘patents per million population’ is used as the sole 
proxy for innovativeness in that particular analysis. In reality, this index on its own does 
not accurately portray innovativeness in a society. Deriving a convincing causal 
relationship simply from this analysis, as to the influence of income equality on 
innovativeness, is even more problematic.  
 In spite of certain shortcomings, many of Wilkinson and Pickett’s (2010) 
arguments are very interesting and quite convincing. Their first argument is that the 
principle of income equality is key in order for government policies to be accepted by 
citizens. The authors go on to argue that when policies are seen to benefit one social 
group at the expense of others, they are likely to be rejected by some people. Normally, 
richer individuals are more likely to account for higher carbon emissions and to 
contribute more to global warming. This is indeed usually the case as greater income 
typically allows for more consumption and energy use. Wilkinson and Pickett claim that 
differences in people’s emissions can be as much as ten-fold in a given society, in 
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function of income (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010: 222). If climate change policies are 
not affecting the rich as much as the poor, they are therefore likely to strike out as unfair 
and be unpopular amongst the public. This point was also brought up during a face-to-
face interview I undertook last June.  
France is currently in a situation of great social inequality. When there is more equality, it 
is easier to reduce emissions as measures impact everyone to a similar extent. It is very 
difficult in highly inegalitarian countries to ask citizens to act. The very wealthy tend to 
squander more resources and be responsible for more pollution. If everyone around the 
world could afford a large car, or to frequently travel by airplane, the emissions situation 
would be much worse. Societies may therefore understandably require the more wealthy 
to contribute more to the mitigation of emissions. Yet the rich may feel persecuted as a 
result, and choose to place their money abroad. Moreover, when there are high levels of 
poverty, it is very difficult to take measures as consequences on those who can barely get 
by are severe. Conversely, people in such a condition can do very little to change their 
consumption habits. In Finland things may be easier, as government measures can impact 
everyone more evenly.  
Loup Verlet, formerly head of research at the CNRS (French National Centre for Scientific 
Research), psychiatrist and philosopher.23 
In reality, it is difficult to imagine a situation where the richest citizens are allowed to 
squander extensive resources, while the rest agree to make sacrifices and cut their 
consumption or otherwise change their lifestyles. This is especially true since climate 
change policies can result in higher energy prices and new forms of taxation, and 
therefore represent an additional economic burden for citizens. In addition, climate 
change policies can be detrimental to economic growth. In a situation where poverty is 
already extensive, governments are therefore likely to be reticent as to being tough on 
carbon emissions. At the global level, this issue is very real and explains why it is 
challenging to require underdeveloped countries to take significant action to tackle their 
emissions. In this sense, more income equality can bring environmental benefits on two 
fronts: it constrains high incomes and high consumption, and also increases the 
likelihood that environmental policies are implemented by governments, as well as 
accepted by citizens. In fact, Ravallion et al. (2000) find that under a situation of greater 
income equality, the elasticity of carbon emissions to growth is lower than under a 
situation of greater income inequality. They conclude that economic growth causes 
increasingly lower emissions over time, in a more egalitarian country. In addition, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Since retiring from a prestigious career as a physicist, Loup Verlet has been focusing his 
research on the study of philosophy and global warming. In the field of climate change, Mr. 
Verlet has contributed to two published books: Le Changement Climatique: aubaine ou 
désastre? (Climate Change: blessing or disaster?) (Adret, 2007) and La Révolution des Métiers 
Verts: 20 passionnés témoignent  (The Revolution of Green Jobs: 20 enthusiasts testify) (Adret, 
2011). 
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Ravallion et al. (2000) find that eventually a more equalitarian situation results in lower 
carbon emissions, as compared to a situation where income inequalities are important 
within a country.  
 Another of Wilkinson and Pickett’s (2010) main arguments is that social 
inequalities encourage consumerism, an unsustainable behaviour that in turn worsens 
global warming. One explanation that the authors identify is that people tend to work 
longer hours in inegalitarian societies. According to the authors, people living in more 
inegalitarian countries work the equivalent of at least two months more on average each 
year (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010: 228). The argument that more inequality leads to 
more working hours has been presented elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Bowles and 
Park, 2005). In turn, Wilkinson and Pickett claim that people tend to work longer hours 
in the aim of improving their economic situation, which then results in higher 
consumption and emissions. Other studies such as Rosnick (2013) support the theory 
that working less would contribute to the reduction of carbon emissions. Rosnick (2013) 
concludes that reducing working hours by 0.5 percent each year, is likely to result in at 
least a 25-50 percent mitigation of any warming that is not yet locked-in (Rosnick, 
2013: 11). This time, the reasoning behind the argument is that low-paid workers cannot 
afford to work less, and a system where employees work more results in more output 
produced (and consequently more carbon emissions). Rosnick (2013) claims that such a 
system is currently in place in the USA, for instance. The average number of hours 
worked in Finland, on the other hand, is amongst the lowest in the EU. Indeed, full-time 
employed Finns worked 40.3 hours a week on average in 2011, compared to a EU-wide 
average of 41.6 hours. Only citizens in Ireland, Lithuania and Denmark worked fewer 
hours that year (Office for National Statistics, 2011). According to the literature 
reviewed above, this relatively low amount of hours worked could have a role to play in 
keeping consumption (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010) and production (Rosnick, 2013) at 
reasonable levels.  
 In addition, in Finland today the welfare state is still extensive and significant 
redistribution takes place. As mentioned previously, the extent of the welfare state has 
somewhat been reduced in Finland, and income inequalities have slightly risen, as 
Finland shifted towards an information economy. This trend has continued in recent 
years, and the risk of exclusion and poverty has somewhat increased since 2008, in 
consequence of the economic recession (Ministry of the Environment, 2009: 57). 
However, income differentials in Finland are still nowadays lesser than the European 
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average. Indeed, the Gini coefficient in 2012 was 0.259 in Finland, 0.306 amongst EU 
countries on average, and 0.305 in France (European Commission, Eurostat). Likewise, 
the inequality of income distribution in 2012, measured as the ratio of total income 
received by the 20 percent of the population with the highest income to that of the 20 
percent of the population with the lowest income, was 5.1 on average amongst EU 
countries, 4.5 in France and 3.7 in Finland (Eurostat). Higher figures in both indices 
indicate more income inequality. In fact, the Finnish welfare state still plays a 
significant role in maintaining income equality in the country, and the redistribution of 
income is extensive in Finland. The role of the Finnish welfare state is well illustrated 
by the relatively low percentage of people at risk of poverty after social transfers, which 
amounted to 13.2 percent of the Finnish population in 2012, against 14.1 percent in 
France and 16.9 percent on average amongst EU countries (Eurostat). In France, the 
welfare state is not as comprehensive and so society relies more on economic growth 
for keeping poverty at bay. In times of economic hardships as we are experiencing 
today, this constrains the government’s will to take significant action on climate change. 
This is well illustrated by the French government’s decision to suspend the carbon tax 
in early 2010, in an effort to maintain the competiveness of French companies.  
When I went to talk to politicians in 2007, there was a mission d’information 
parlementaire in place.24 It was very active. I could see that people both from the right 
and the left where preoccupied with this issue. Yet in France today, it is evident that the 
political discourse fails to portray the seriousness of climate change. Today people are 
worried about the economic crisis, which appears endless to many. In this context, 
environmental issues often appear relatively less problematic and the government has put 
on hold previous commitments related to climate change. 
Loup Verlet 
In Finland, the low income differentials and low poverty rates have a role to play in 
facilitating policymaking. In theory, it should be easier for politicians to take action on 
climate change in Finland. In addition, the smaller proportion of very wealthy citizens 
in Finland entails that less natural resources are ‘wasted’, and emissions correspond 
more tightly to the basic needs of the population. All in all, there are reasons to believe 
that the extensive welfare state can constitute a significant advantage for Finland in its 
mitigation of carbon emissions. The potential for the Finnish society to accept new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The mission d'information parlementaire sur l'effet de serre (parliamentary information 
mission on the greenhouse effect) was a commission of experts chosen to report to the French 
National Assembly on the issue of climate change.  	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policies is particularly important in this respect, and is related to the idea of social 
cohesion discussed in the next section. 
 
 
3.2. Social cohesion 
 
 
 The paper showed that social cohesion is strong in Finland, and argued that this 
has helped Finland embrace ICT and transit towards the information economy. There 
are reasons to believe that social cohesion could also be beneficial at present day to any 
climate change mitigation effort. Realistic strategies for mitigating climate change are 
found in the area of societal governance, and societal changes are the key to changing 
our impact on the environment (Pielke and Sarewitz, 2005). Energy policies on their 
own are insufficient, and policymakers have to include citizens in the equation if they 
want to instigate real change. Indeed, a significant share of carbon emissions depends 
on individual choices. In function of one’s consumption choices, domestic energy and 
water use, transport preferences, as well as waste generation and recycling habits, he or 
she will contribute to varying amounts of emissions (OECD, 2008: 5). The state can 
influence the behaviour of citizens, but a lot of discretion is left to the individual in the 
end. Typically, a combination of ‘public’ and ‘private’ considerations will influence a 
citizen’s behaviour (OECD, 2008: 13). For some decisions, the two aspects are aligned. 
Purchasing an electric car, for example, has both the merit of reducing carbon emissions 
(public benefit) and to save the user money on fuel (private benefit). Most of the time, 
however, private and public benefits are not aligned. In this instance, one has to weigh 
the private benefits linked to a particular choice with its social costs. It is usually more 
convenient to drive to work than to cycle there, for instance, and consequently it may 
make more sense to do so from an individualistic point of view. 
We are often in the case of carbon emissions in a prisoner’s dilemma situation, and the 
problem is twofold: time and the number of people. Since most of the effects of global 
warming will take place in the distant future, it’s easy for people to think: “I shouldn’t be 
too worried, I won’t be the one suffering the consequences of my actions.” Similarly, 
people can judge their impact to be negligible when compared to the aggregate seven 
billion humans, and reach the conclusion: “It makes no difference whether I take my car 
to work instead of cycling there.” In both cases, the outcome is the same; individualist 
behaviour leads to more emissions. Eventually the group as a whole will be worse off 
because of the negative effects of global warming.  
Loup Verlet 
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Yet one’s decision to cycle may be influenced by the environmental implications of 
driving. The more a person attaches value to public benefits, the more he or she is likely 
to participate in the common project that is the mitigation of climate change. In this 
respect, a sense of belonging to a wider community is crucial, and civic concerns 
encourage the altruistic and cooperative behaviours that the reduction in personal 
emissions requires (Moser, 2009).  
 The idea that the Finnish society is cohesive was presented earlier in this paper, 
and this sense of belonging to a community could be very important in influencing 
citizen behaviours today. The relative income equality in Finland may be key in this 
respect, and Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) present the hypothesis that people are more 
likely to cooperate in an equalitarian society. The authors use the example of recycling, 
and show that recycling tends to be more widespread in more equalitarian countries, and 
vice versa (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010: 232). Moreover, Halvorsen (2008) shows that 
non-economic motivations have a considerable influence on household recycling 
behaviours. Moral commitment is particularly important in this respect, as well as 
positive attitudes towards environmental policies. His study finds that people who are 
concerned about environmental issues, and people who believe that recycling is a civic 
duty, are much more likely to recycle their waste. On the opposite, people who think 
future generations should deal with environmental issues, and people who think they 
should not incur costs as a result of environmental polices, recycle considerably less 
than the rest (Halvorsen, 2008: 18). In Finland, recycling is a common practice. In 2011, 
about 60 percent of municipal waste in Finland was recollected as material or energy, 
and as much as 70 percent of paper waste was recycled (Ministry of the Environment 
and Statistics Finland, 2013: 55). The high propensity of Finns to recycle extends to the 
office. One study finds that 58 percent of Finns interviewed ‘always or mostly sort their 
energy waste’ at the workplace, and as much as 94 percent ‘recycle office paper always 
or very often’. In addition, about half of the employees interviewed showed ‘responsible 
general environmental behaviour’ (Koivisto, 2008: 125). The fact that Finns are 
attached to their environment, and have a good awareness of climate change, may also 
be beneficial in this respect. Indeed, the 2007 Finnish Science Barometer revealed that 
72 percent of Finns were interested in the state of the environment, while the 2013 
version of the survey showed that a very large majority of Finns (87 percent) followed 
the issue of climate change (Finnish Science Barometer, 2007; 2013).  
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 This paper also defended previously the idea that state legitimacy is high in 
Finland, and that consequently Finns tend to trust governmental institutions and accept 
their policies.25 The willingness to accept changes instigated by the state is crucial in 
order for a country to decrease its carbon footprint, and this is well illustrated by a 
recent example. The French government’s decision to install a new heavy goods vehicle 
(HGV) Ecotax from the 1st of January 2014 was met with violent social contestation, 
and its implementation had to be postponed. This new emissions tax was directed at 
lorries, taxing their travel on French roads in an effort to make the commercial transport 
sector accountable for its carbon emissions. Throughout France, the new policy was met 
with criticism and resulted in various demonstrations in the autumn of 2013. Such 
demonstrations were particularly violent in the Bretagne region, where Ecotax portals 
were systematically destroyed. The tax actually instigated the birth of a new social 
contestation movement, known as the Bonnets rouges (Red bonnets). In reaction to the 
social unrest, in early November the government announced its decision to postpone the 
implementation of the Ecotax, to at least until July 2014. Typically, social cohesion is 
very low in France and government policies rarely gain widespread public support. 
Policies that threaten established lifestyles, or imply income changes, are often met with 
social unrest. This renders policymaking very difficult and often unsuccessful. This is 
particularly problematic in the area of climate change policies, which often require 
some sacrifices.  
 Conversely, governmental communication is essential to mobilise and unite 
citizens to engage in the mitigation of climate change (Moser, 2009). Citizens do not 
necessarily support the climate change project out of a sense of global responsibility. 
According to Teräväinen (2010), the Finnish state has realized this and sought to 
legitimize its climate change policy by utilizing what she calls the ‘rhetoric of 
possibility’ (Teräväinen, 2010: 414). In effect, the state incorporates its environmental 
strategy into a wider innovation and technology policy. The proclaimed aim of policies 
is to increase the competiveness of Finnish firms and restore economic growth, on top 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  This paper does not defend the idea that state legitimacy in Finland is absolute, however, or 
civic participation complete. Most recently the Finnish Science Barometer 2013 revealed some 
mistrust for political and administrative systems in Finland, for example. The survey indeed 
showed that Finns have very little trust in political parties and that a majority even mistrusts the 
parliament, although to a much lesser extent (Finnish Science Barometer, 2013). Yet, as in the 
1990s, this somewhat critical perception of politics rarely gives way to contestation movements 
today, and hardly ever hinders policymaking. 	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of participating in the global project that is climate change mitigation. The 
commercialisation of environmental innovations is presented as a way to restore export-
led growth, in light of the expanding global market for cleantech. In addition, energy 
policy is largely concerned with reducing costly energy imports, and so the ambition of 
self-sufficiency has held a central place in the debate. The Strategic Programme for 
Cleantech (2012), for example, states its intention to:  
[Coordinate] a clean energy programme to balance Finland’s current account and create a 
lead market for increasing the share of renewable energy, and for creating and 
commercialising new innovations (Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 2012: 1).  
The ‘rhetoric of possibility’ has helped draw societal support for the state ecological 
modernisation strategy. Teräväinen (2011), for instance, finds that the topic of energy 
technologies was rarely separated from the wider topic of technology-driven economic 
growth in the Finnish press. The newspaper Helsingin Sanomat, for example, has 
expressed continuous support for state energy policies, and even relayed a sense of 
generalized trust within society for governmental strategies. The idea of new potential 
for export-led growth was well supported, whereas the issue of global responsibility 
was far less covered. In addition, coverage on the notion of opportunities generated by 
climate change has intensified in recent years. Many articles have been hopeful, 
conveying the sense that energy technologies have the potential to create employment 
opportunities (Teräväinen, 2011: 14). In fact, Finland has been repeatedly presented as a 
success story in the press, and as an international leader in the areas pursued by the 
government. The British press, on the other hand, has been considerably more critical of 
climate change policies in the United Kingdom (Teräväinen, 2011). Likewise, the 
negative portrayal of wind power in the Swedish media has resulted in the lack of 
legitimacy and low social acceptance for this project (Negro et al., 2012). In turn, 
cleantech gaining legitimacy is dependant on the public’s trust in political institutions. 
In countries where state communication is less successful, climate change may reflect as 
a controversial or an unimportant issue. In USA, for example, this partly explains why 
civic engagement is relatively low (Moser, 2009).  
 Social movements and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have played a 
significant role around the world in the ecological transformation of society, by putting 
pressure on policymakers to adopt a tough stance on environmental issues. In Nordic 
countries, this form of public engagement has typically been one of collaboration rather 
than conflict (Sonnenfeld, 2002). Environmental organisations tend to be less strongly 
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anti-industry in these countries, and more willing to cooperate with other actors to bring 
about solutions. Environmentalists have exerted their influence by participating in 
diverse branches of governments, and on the board of directors of public companies. In 
Finland in particular, environmental organisations have been significantly more 
integrated within policymaking then in other countries such as France and the UK 
(Teräväinen, 2012). Cooperative modes of policymaking have been fostered with 
respect to environmental issues in Finland, and this has limited the space for criticism 
within society. The work of Ilmastovanhemmat (Climate Parents), for example, is 
highly interesting. Ilmastovanhemmat is an NGO that regroups concerned Finnish 
citizens and tries to incite Finnish politicians to do more to mitigate climate change. I 
contacted Ilmastovanhemmat’s chairperson, and she demonstrated well to me the 
determination some Finns have to encourage their government to take action: 
Ilmastovanhemmat is an organization of ordinary mothers and fathers who are worried 
about climate change, and how it will affect our children. Our message is that, in order to 
be able to slow down climate change, we need to achieve major changes in climate and 
energy policy. Finland is far from doing enough to save the climate. The decisions and 
actions to cut down CO2 emissions need to be taken now and it’s the task of today’s 
policymakers. They can’t wait and let someone else take the decisions later. And they 
can’t wait for the problem to be solved somewhere else. Our aim is to make them 
understand their role in the process. Thus, our organisation’s goal is to change Finnish 
climate policy. The more power one has, the more responsibility he has. We think that 
climate change cannot be tackled only by consumer choices and that we need to put 
pressure on policymakers as well. 
Liisa Selvenius-Hurme, chairperson of Ilmastovanhemmat. 
 In addition, measures taken by local governments are crucial to mitigating 
climate change. Indeed, action at the local level is particularly relevant as each region 
has different climate change adaptation and mitigation costs, due to varying geographic 
and socio-economic situations. Societies that are more cohesive, and where diverse 
actors cooperate and take actions at the local level, are better suited to deal with climate 
change (Vega-López, 2011). Local action is greater when everyone takes responsibility 
for their emissions, and shows solidarity for the people who face greater potential 
threats because of global warming. This is also true at the scale of a country. In Finland, 
for instance, the polar region in the North is more vulnerable to global warming 
(Ministry of the Environment and Statistics Finland, 2013: 186). Its ecosystem is 
endangered, as are the lifestyles of the people who depend on it. Cities in the south are 
far less a risk, and it is believed that a large part of the country could actually benefit 
from global warming for some time. Yet a large number (over a third) of Finnish 
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municipalities already have a climate mitigation programme in place, or are in the 
process of installing one (Ministry of the Environment and Statistics Finland, 2013: 
98).26 In effect, Finnish municipalities have regularly chosen to go beyond national 
strategies, and to have a greater impact on society and local emissions than what was 
asked of them by the central government. Local entities have a particular role to play in 
influencing the lifestyles of citizens, by deciding on waste management and public 
transport for instance, as well as energy efficiency through their building permits grant 
choices. In Lahti, for example, an exceptional waste management system is in place, 
and 90 percent of waste is utilised thanks to the separation of waste within households. 
The Helsinki Metropolitan Area, also, runs since 2010 a Climateinfo scheme aimed at 
increasing awareness amongst local residents, and offers solutions via information 
campaigns and discussion forums. On several levels, therefore, the cohesive nature of 
the Finnish society can be beneficial to any national effort to curb GHG emissions.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 By 2013, over 50 municipalities had joined the Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) 
programme, for example, aimed at encouraging localities to implement measures to reduce 
GHG emissions. The Carbon Neutral Municipalities (HINKU) project is one example of 
programmes aiming to achieve this. The HINKU project brings together municipalities, firms 
and citizens to come up with emissions mitigation solutions and ways to best implement them.  
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3.3. Effective universities 
  
 
 This paper argued previously that public education spending in Finland was 
impressive in the 1990s. In parallel, the education level of Finns grew rapidly, and 
particularly in the areas of science and technology. At the time, universities had also 
exposed their students to ICT use, and conducted research increasingly beneficial for 
private companies. Thereby, universities had further effectively participated in the 
development of the ICT sector in the country. The evidence shows that such 
developments have continued in recent years, and that the impact of higher education in 
Finland has continued to increase since the late 1990s. Between 1995 and 2007, the 
number of students in Finnish universities has increased by 30 percent, the number of 
Masters degrees awarded by over 40 percent, and the number of doctoral degrees 
obtained by nearly 100 percent (Sitra, 2010: 44). By 2012, 38 percent of the total adult 
population was tertiary-qualified in Finland, and the plan is to increase tertiary 
attainment to 42 percent by 2020 (OECD, 2012a: 288; 290). In comparison, the EU 
average was 30 percent in 2012 (OECD, 2012a: 12). In parallel, the number of research 
personnel in universities has risen by 70 percent between 1995 and 2007, and university 
research funding has more than doubled, rising from EUR 425 million to EUR 876 
million (Sitra, 2010: 44). The research output of Finnish universities is impressive as 
well, and in 2009 Finland produced 0.65 percent of world scientific publications and 1 
percent of world citations, with just 0.09 percent of the world population (Sitra, 2010: 
44).  
 The science and technology fields are still the strong suits of Finnish education 
today, and the share of tertiary graduates in science and technology amounted to 21.7 
percent of the population aged twenty to twenty-nine in 2012 (Eurostat). In comparison, 
the EU average was 16.8 percent in 2011. In addition, amongst European countries, 
Finland had the highest proportion of doctoral students in the science and technology 
fields in 2012 (1.36 percent of the population aged twenty to twenty-nine) (Eurostat). In 
effect, Finns receive high-quality teaching in these fields from a young age, and Finland 
has been ranked amongst the top five in all five PISA studies, in terms of science 
literacy (including first in 2003 and 2006) (OECD, PISA). Thanks to such teaching 
focus, the Finnish labour force is well trained in the science and technology fields, and 
37 percent of Finns were employed in these areas in 2012 (OECD, 2012b: 288). Just 
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like ICT, environmental business is a knowledge-intensive sector. As one observer 
notes: 
A competitive energy workforce requires much more than technicians and building 
retrofitters. Scientists, engineers, high-tech entrepreneurs, and advanced manufacturers 
will play a critical role, just as they have in strategic sectors like infotech, aerospace, and 
biotech.27 
Finland’s highly educated workforce, and particularly strong know-how in the science 
and technology fields, has the potential to greatly benefit the development of the 
cleantech sector in the country (Dawe et al., 2005).  
 Moreover, the Finnish education system has gradually incorporated sustainable 
development into its curriculums, and young Finns entering the job market have 
increasingly good knowledge of environmental issues such as climate change.28 Finnish 
universities and polytechnics offer courses related to the study of energy and climate 
change, and even degrees specialised in these fields. This teaching area is increasingly 
popular, and the number of relevant courses offered, as well as students studying in 
these courses, is steadily increasing. For example, half of the master’s degree 
programmes offered at the Faculty of Science and Forestry of the University of Eastern 
Finland were directly related to climate change and sustainability. This department has 
thereby trained over one hundred specialists in the field of energy and climate change 
(Ministry of the Environment and Statistics Finland, 2013: 266). As early as 2000, 
twenty-one out of twenty-nine Finnish polytechnics offered training programmes in 
environmental studies, and sixteen out of twenty universities had education and research 
units involved in sustainable development (Loukola et al., 2001: 39; 41). That year, 
about 45 percent of Finnish university students studied sustainable development in 
some form, and 2.3 percent of polytechnic students majored in environmental subjects. 
At postgraduate level, approximately 7.5 percent of students were enrolled in 
programmes directly related to environmental issues, and about 2 percent of Masters 
degrees were awarded in this field (Loukola et al., 2001: 44-45). Such students with 
technical knowledge in environmental fields provide a useful source of researchers, as 
well as employees for firms operating in this sector. Likewise, Rohweder (2004) finds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Quote taken from the Forbes website (Norris, 2010: para. 5). 
28 Various governmental strategies, such as the Finnish Government Sustainable Development 
Programme (1998), the National Action Plan for Biodiversity (1997-2005), and the 
(supranational) Baltic 21 Action Programme (1998), have emphasized the need for the 
integration of sustainable development in the Finnish education system.	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that nearly all Finnish business polytechnics offer environmental education as part of 
their curriculum. Rohweder (2004) goes on to claim that this is particularly important, 
as the field of business studies tends to train some of the influential stakeholders of 
tomorrow. Because of the attention awarded to environmental issues within the Finnish 
education system, there are reasons to believe that Finland has an advantage over many 
other nations, and the potential to be internationally competitive in the cleantech sector. 
In the USA, for example, the absence of such an education strategy has been criticised: 
Even if the United States adopts a real industrial policy for clean energy, there is little 
evidence that our workforce is skilled enough to compete. […] The federal government 
has not implemented an education strategy to keep the U.S. at the leading edge of energy 
science, technology, and entrepreneurship. Unfortunately, the majority of our colleges 
and universities lack degree programs focused on energy, and the U.S. power engineering 
education system is on the decline. […] The energy workforce deficit and STEM 
education gap will substantially limit the nation’s ability to lead the clean-tech industry 
and accelerate clean energy development.29 
 Yet education also has the role of shaping the behaviour of future citizens, and is 
therefore key to any realistic climate change mitigation strategy. Indeed, such an effort 
is dependent on the cooperative behaviour of citizens, and the cleantech sector is 
dependant to some extent on the national demand for environmental products and 
services. This role is well recognised by international institutions such as the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO): 
Education is the primary agent of transformation towards sustainable development, 
increasing people’s capacities to transform their visions for society into reality. Education 
not only provides scientific and technical skills, it also provides the motivation, 
justification, and social support for pursuing and applying them. The international 
community now strongly believes that we need to foster — through education — the 
values, behaviour and lifestyles required for a sustainable future (UNESCO, 2005: 5). 
This had also been emphasised in Finland, and one government strategy for instance 
states:  
The principles of sustainable development will be taken into account in the educational 
provision and other activities of different school forms (Ministry of Education, 2004: 3). 
Johnston (2007) shows that universities can encourage environmental sustainability, 
through their resource use and waste efficiency, the protection of biodiversity on 
campus, their investments in buildings and facilities, as well as their involvement with 
the community on sustainability projects. The university thereby can act as a 
demonstrator of good practises, and even as an agent of change. In Finland, by the end 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Quote taken from the Forbes website (Norris, 2010: para. 4; 6).	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of the 1990s, nearly all universities had prepared a plan for sustainable development, 
particularly concerned with energy use, waste management and commuting (Loukola et 
al., 2001: 39). Similarly, universities can encourage their staff to engage in 
environmentally friendly behaviours, through reward schemes for instance. Of course, 
through their teaching, universities can also shape students’ ideas and influence their 
behaviour. Universities can thereby transmit to their students some knowledge on 
environmental issues, and the will to act to mitigate them. Many teaching institutions in 
Finland also offer continuous programmes open to adults and companies, providing 
training in areas related to climate change. Finland’s high levels of adult education can 
be beneficial, as this gives an opportunity to teaching institutions to shape the behaviour 
of adults on top of the youth. Further education is helpful in itself, as environmental 
awareness increases with the education level, and accordingly the tendency do adopt 
environmentally friendly practices such as recycling (OECD, 2008: 183). Universities 
play a further role by encouraging students to engage themselves with environmental 
issues, at university but also within the community (Johnston, 2007).30 Dawe et al. 
(2005) call this ‘re-connecting to reality’, and identify the involvement of students in 
the local sustainable development strategy to be extremely valuable. Students can 
thereby exercise their knowledge on the ground, as well as enact changes within the 
community (Dawe et al., 2005: 21). 	  
 Research is another area in which higher education institutions (HEIs) have a 
unique position and responsibility (Johnston, 2007). Typically, universities are well 
suited for conducting research on sustainable development, due to its interdisciplinary 
nature. Yet establishing partnerships with other actors in society is key to directing 
university research towards socially useful aims. HEIs can further play the role of 
intermediaries, bringing together the diverse actors involved in sustainable 
development. In Finland, a HEI that gets its core funding from the state must actively 
participate in the local commitments to sustainability in its teaching programmes and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The University of Helsinki, for instance, held the Helsinki Climate Forum in September 2013. 
Organised by students, the event brought experts and students together for some lectures and 
seminars on the topic of climate change. Similarly, Aalto University hosted the Nordic Climate 
Festival in August-September 2011, a four-day event on the issue of global warming. Thirty 
thousand Finnish students have also taken part in the Partnership and Participation for a 
Sustainable Tomorrow (SUPPOR) network, and its CO2nnect programme. This scheme 
functions as an international school providing students with knowledge on climate change and 
its implication for society, as well as useful skills to participate in the local decision-making 
process. 
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R&D activities (Johnston, 2007). This encourages collaboration with key stakeholders 
such as local authorities and private companies. One example of such cooperation in 
Finland is the Efficient Energy Use Program (EEUP), which regroups eight major 
industry actors and five universities. The aim of the EEUP is to develop know-how and 
foster innovation in the promising sector of energy efficient products and service. In 
fact, the Finnish university system was reformed in 2009, with the main outcome being 
the increased autonomy of HEIs and enhanced private funding opportunities. The 2009 
University Act further acknowledged the importance of Finnish universities as research 
institutions. All in all, the potential for Finnish HEIs to participate in the national 
climate change mitigation effort is well summarized by the Turku University of Applied 
Sciences’ strategy:  
In ten years time the Turku University of Applied Sciences will be a leader in sustainable 
development through its strategies and operations by: having a clear action plan for 
sustainable development, ensuring that all staff act sustainably and all students have the 
capacity to implement sustainability in the work and private life, promoting regional 
sustainable development, developing a fully sustainable real and virtual campus, and 
rewarding green activities by staff and students (Johnston, 2007: 27). 
Such ambitions indeed demonstrate that Finnish universities can effectively help society 
evolve towards more environmentally conscious means of consumption and production. 
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3.4. Public-private partnerships 
 
 
 This paper argued in Chapter I that established public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) had encouraged private investment in ICT in the 1990s, and the growth of firms 
operating in this sector. This paper also presented some market failures associated with 
the development and commercialisation of new technologies, which called for the 
implementation of such PPPs. These failures apply to the cleantech sector, and 
additional issues specific to cleantech render their development even more problematic 
than in the case of ICT. The tradition of collaboration between public and private sector 
actors could therefore be a valuable asset for Finland today. In effect, the current system 
is in a state of ‘carbon lock-in’, as fossil fuel-based energy systems and carbon-
intensive technologies act as barriers to the development of cleantech (Unruh, 2000). 
Indeed, established energy sources and technologies benefit from economies of scales, 
long periods of technological learning, and social-institutional embedding (Negro et al., 
2012). For these reasons, cleantech are rarely competitive within the existing system. In 
addition, profit opportunities in the emerging cleantech sector are difficult to quantify 
for investors, as demand and technological capabilities are uncertain (imperfect 
information). This risk further results in under-investment, and consequently firms 
operating in the cleantech industry need to be supported by public institutions (Foxon, 
2002).  
 This is well demonstrated in recent case studies. Mackin (2006), for instance, 
shows that PPPs were key to the development of the solar industry in San Francisco. 
State assistance to firms, such as financial aid, is identified as vital. In addition, 
collaboration in R&D was more lucrative than competition, and the state has had a key 
role to play in fostering cooperation. Through their study of the wind-power sector in 
Portugal, Martins et al. (2011) show that PPPs are not limited to direct financial 
assistance. The creation of a wind-power cluster in the country was successful in 
increasing private participation by encouraging risk sharing between private and public 
sector actors. The public sector significantly reduced uncertainty by removing the 
demand risk (by purchasing the energy produced) and the subsequent commercial risk 
(stable revenue flow). In effect, the state has managed to guarantee short-term returns 
on investments. Likewise, Manos et al. (2014) who looked at the bioenergy sector in 
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Greece, show that PPPs have the potential to mitigate various types of risks, including 
authorisation risks, financing risks, and contracting risks.  	   In Finland, the state recently took an important commitment to supporting the 
national cleantech sector. In February 2012, the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy launched the Strategic Programme for Cleantech, a plan to increase national 
cleantech turnover to EUR 50 billion by 2020, and to create 40,000 jobs in the process 
(Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 2012). In effect, the plan makes cleantech 
a focus area of Finnish economic policy, and aims to turn Finland into a ‘world leader’ 
in environmental business.31 The Strategic Programme’s support for companies is 
mainly orchestrated through three institutions: Tekes, Sitra and Finpro.32 Arguably, as 
with ICT, Tekes is the most important tool for public support to cleantech companies. In 
fact, Tekes has participated in the funding of over 60 percent of recent Finnish 
innovations (Tekes, 2012: 8). In 2011 alone, Tekes provided funding for nearly two 
thousand projects and to as many firms, amounting to EUR 610 million in financing 
(Tekes, 2012: 7). More than half of funds were invested in enterprises projects, and 
targeted at SMEs in particular (58 percent). Tekes provides funding at the early stages 
for a wide range of emerging ideas, and runs a particular program for young innovative 
companies that received EUR 49 million in financing in 2011. Start-up companies 
qualify for other types of assistance, such as expertise and assistance with their 
decision-making. Large companies are also eligible for funding, as long as they 
participate in cooperative projects with research institutions and universities, or SMEs. 
In addition, Tekes took part alongside firms in R&D&I activity worth EUR 860 million, 
with EUR 349 million invested in the R&D projects of companies in particular.  
 A very large share of Tekes funding (38 percent or EUR 230 million, in 2011) is 
invested in the fields of energy and the environment. One example of Tekes cleantech 
programmes is the BioRefine scheme that ran from 2007 to 2012. The total budget for 
BioRefine was EUR 137 million, aimed at developing innovative products, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The plan identifies three major policy areas with the potential to support the national 
cleantech industry: ‘embedding cleantech across the entire administration’, ‘creating the best 
domestic markets for cleantech companies aiming at international markets’, and ‘spurring 
business growth through internationalisation’. Concrete measures proposed include: dedicating 
EUR 100-200 million in public funding to a Clean Energy programme, investing an additional 
EUR 325 million in promising cleantech firms, and helping eighty Finnish cleantech SMEs 
enter global markets by the end of 2018 (Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 2012). 
32 Finnvera is also a major source of funding for Finnish firms in general, having granted over 
EUR 756 million in financing (loans and guarantees) to SMEs in 2013 alone (Finnvera, 2013). 
However, this paper does not identify Finnvera as a key player in cleantech PPPs in particular. 
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technologies, and services related to the refining of biomass. The specific aims were to 
promote the implication of SMEs in niche products and markets, and to encourage the 
commercialisation of the innovations developed. In 2008, the combined value of 
BioRefine enterprise projects was approximately EUR 51 million, with Tekes funding 
accounting for around EUR 20 million (Tekes, 2008: 6). Currently, Tekes is involved in 
a number of cleantech projects, such as the Green Growth (2011-2015, EUR 79 
million), Growth for Renewables (2010-2014, EUR 95 million) and EVE- Electronic 
vehicles systems (2011-2015, EUR 80 million) programmes. The ambition of these 
schemes is once again to work with the business sector, and to improve the 
competiveness of Finnish cleantech SMEs. 
 Another key institution involved in cleantech PPPs today is Sitra. Between 2008 
and 2012, for instance, Sitra ran the Energy Programme. It involved the financing of 
projects aimed at increasing the energy efficiency of infrastructures, creating 
opportunities for business involved in the transition towards renewable energies, as well 
as raising awareness on energy issues. In total, Sitra has invested in eighty projects and 
about EUR 9.1 million in the context of its Energy Programme (Ministry of the 
Environment and Statistics Finland, 2013: 238). Through its business development and 
investment activities, Sitra provides direct funding to individual firms. Sitra’s ‘Power 
Fund III’, for instance, is an investment fund directed at the development of low carbon-
emitting technologies and renewable energy technology. Examples of significant Sitra 
cleantech investments include a 10-percent ownership of AW-Energy (wave power), and 
a 13-percent ownership of One1 (renewables solutions) (Sitra, 2013: 25). At the end of 
2012, Sitra’s endowment capital was valued at EUR 651 million (Sitra, 2013: 16).  
 Finally, Finpro also provides considerable support to Finnish cleantech 
companies. This entity is largely financed by the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy, which also sets the agency’s main objectives and strategies. Finpro 
administers the Cleantech Finland program, for instance, constituted of ninety 
companies and twenty-five partners in 2012. Cleantech Finland is a program tailored to 
support the growth of Finnish cleantech companies, and 75 percent of Finpro’s clients 
were SMEs in 2012 (Finpro, 2012: 3). Finpro thereby offers advice and guidance to 
cleantech firms seeking to internationalise, as well as networking opportunities. 
Finpro’s main ambition is to help Finnish cleantech firms capture foreign markets, and 
especially developing ones such as in China and India. More precisely, it assists Finnish 
firms in identifying business opportunities abroad, establishing themselves in foreign 
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markets, and improving their position once settled. The importance of the support 
provided by public institutions was mentioned by two Finnish cleantech entrepreneurs I 
contacted:  
Once Keksintösäätiö (Finnish innovation association) took us onboard into “Tuoteväylä”, 
they started funding us.33 We got about EUR 70,000 during 18 months from them and 
used it to improve the concept, packaging design, IPR (intellectual property rights, A/N) 
studies, branding, deposit management system and market research. We also received 
funding from Tekes and Lahti Science & Business Park (now Ladec). In addition, we got 
a grant from Huonekalusäätiö (Furniture Association) in 2008 and an award from the 
Packaging Association (Pactec) in 2013. 
Jonne Hellgren, chief executive officer (CEO) of RePack.34 
Tekes, Seed Fund Vera (Finnvera) and Cleantech Invest funded the company in addition 
to the entrepreneurs. 
Feodor Aminoff, CEO of Ultranat.35 
In addition, both respondents claimed that they felt that public agencies significantly 
helped them in developing their business, which goes to show that in some cases at least 
PPPs are successfully implemented on the ground 
 Just like with ICT, there are good reasons to believe that it is advantageous for 
actors in the cleantech sector to collaborate, and that cooperation is best undertaken 
within close geographic proximity. Indeed, in a system involving many interdependent 
actors, knowledge diffusion in the system is key (Negro et al., 2012). This is the case 
with cleantech, and firms operating in this sector are dependent of the research 
undertaken by third parties, and on the regulations and assistance of public entities. 
Uncertainty can be reduced, and technological development accelerated, if the different 
actors are connected (Negro et al., 2012). In effect, positive externalities can materialise 
through the contact and cooperation of complementary actors. Learning networks 
should therefore be established between research institutions, capital providers and 
innovators for the efficient development and commercialisation of cleantech 
innovations. Indeed, there often exists a gap between the knowledge produced at 
universities and the specific skills needed in reality, for instance. Consequently, greater 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Tuoteväylä (Product Track) is a national expert service that provides promising inventors 
with advice and funding to help them commercialise their invention. 
34 RePack is a Finnish SME producing reusable packaging for e-commerce. 
35 Ultranat was a Finnish SME developing and marketing methods allowing for the processing 
of bioenergy power plant ash into reusable products.  
Note: Ultranat is no longer in operation, although the responses provided refer to that particular 
project. The respondent is currently involved in other cleantech ventures however.  
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proximity between teaching institutions and the industry is valuable, to encourage 
universities and research institutions to conduct teaching and research with potential 
benefits for the industry (Negro et al., 2012).  
 In addition, a close link with the private sector allows for ‘learning by doing’, as 
lessons form the commercialization of innovations can be used to inform upstream 
R&D (Rothwell, 1994). As long as firms have the potential to make some returns on 
their investment, it may be more efficient for the state to subsidize private research 
rather than undertaking R&D on its own (Jaffer et al., 2004). This is indeed often the 
case, as private companies may possess more information as to the potential 
commercialisation opportunities of particular technologies. Involving the private sector 
may prove particularly pertinent in the sense that public resources are limited, and R&D 
in the energy sector has an opportunity cost in terms of the foregone R&D in other 
sectors (Popp, 2004). Moreover, Manos et al. (2014) find that geographic proximity 
between cleantech actors can enhance trust and cooperation between parties. This study 
concludes that the interaction of companies with authorities at the local level is 
important for the generation of PPPs, as well as for their cost effectiveness and overall 
success. 
 In Finland, the regional clustering of cleantech actors is largely implemented 
within the Finnish Cleantech Cluster, a scheme coordinated by the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy. The Cleantech Cluster regroups over four hundred 
companies with universities and research institutions, and approximately 60 percent of 
cleantech business, as well as 80 percent of cleantech research, takes place within this 
clustering scheme. The main aims of the programme are to encourage collaboration 
between participating actors, and to promote the internationalisation of Finnish SMEs. 
The Cleantech Cluster includes four Centres of Expertise focused in cleantech areas: 
Kuopio, Lahti, Oulu and the Helsinki region. This paper previously presented the Centre 
of Expertise Programme (OSKE), which already in the 1990s encouraged cooperation 
between universities and research institutions, government agencies, municipalities, and 
companies. Just as with ICT, the aim of OSKE today is to link closely research to 
funding sources, and to encourage cooperation in cleantech R&D. From 2014, the 
OSKE scheme is to be replaced by the Innovative Cities (INKA) programme, with the 
similar aim of encouraging cooperation between national and regional actors in the 
context of innovation. Out of the thirteen competence clusters, several are implicated in 
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R&D related to climate change and energy, such as the Energy Technology, Cleantech, 
and Forest Industry Future competence clusters.  
 Strategic Centres for Science, Technology and Innovation (SHOKs) have also 
played an important role in encouraging synergies between diverse public and private 
sector stakeholders since 2007. SHOKs are PPPs in themselves, regrouping private 
companies and their funding (40 percent) with research institutions in the aim of 
efficiently undertaking research in particular focus areas. About a third of Tekes 
funding for large companies is directed at SHOKs, as well as EUR 48 million for 
research institutions and universities (Tekes, 2012: 11). In fact, Tekes dedicates 20 
percent of all its funding (EUR 81 million) to the SHOK research programmes (Tekes, 
2012: 6). Within SHOKs, Tekes encourages the networking of research institutions with 
companies, to better meet the requirements identified by the business sector. In addition, 
research institutions and universities receive assistance and funding directed at the 
commercialisation of their research findings. The CLEEN Ltd SHOK, a limited 
company jointly owned by research institutes and the industry, is focused on energy and 
the environment. In practice, it acts as a platform in which public and private sector 
actors can jointly conduct R&D related to cleantech. About half of the costs (30-70 
percent) are covered by public sector agencies such as Tekes, which contributes EUR 
12 million to the project each year (Jacobson, 2013: 6). CLEEN ltd involves private 
companies from nine major industrial sectors, combining revenues exceeding EUR 70 
billlion. Such Finnish cleantech firms include large multinationals such as Metso and 
Neste Oil, but also numerous SMEs. PPPs are also organised by individual 
municipalities, in a similar manner to the local schemes implemented in the 1990s with 
respect to ICT. The City of Helsinki, for instance, runs the Climate Partners programme 
since 2012, in an aim to spur collaboration between the city council and local 
businesses.36 Therefore, this paper finds that today, as in the late 1990s, a lot of 
collaboration takes place between state institutions and private firms in Finland. Such 
cooperation is recommended by the literature in the emerging and risky sector that is 
cleantech. Just like with ICT, the common implementation of PPPs in Finland today is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 More specifically, Climate Partners encourages the undertaking of collaborative projects, as 
well as creates a platform for innovative ideas. The City of Helsinki currently has forty-five 
partners, including local authorities, national agencies such as Sitra and SYKE, universities 
such as the University of Helsinki, as well as private companies such as ABB and Elisa.  
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an attribute that is proving particularly beneficial for the development of a competitive 
cleantech sector in the country.  
 
 
3.5. A favourable policy environment 
 
 
 This thesis showed previously that the Finnish state installed in the 1990s a 
policy environment favourable to the development of the ICT sector, by combining 
public R&D funding with deregulation in key areas. This unique balance between state 
intervention and liberalisation was crucial to encouraging innovation in new fields, 
while ensuring at the same time a competitive business sector. Similarly, there is 
evidence that the Finnish state today is installing an environment supportive of 
innovation in cleantech and favourable to a competitive national cleantech sector. This 
paper presented in the previous section two key market failures associated with the 
development of cleantech; the issues of technological ‘lock-in’ and imperfect 
information. Two additional shortcomings are further responsible for the 
underinvestment in cleantech R&D. The first is the classic externality problem, the fact 
that emissions are typically not priced on the market and so the incentive to adopt 
cleantech is low for private firms. The second is the issue of knowledge spillover, the 
reality that innovation creates a positive externality in the form of information spillovers 
for other firms, which patenting can only partly resolve (Geroski, 1995). As a result, 
although a successful innovator will reap rewards from undertaken R&D, these rewards 
will typically be much less than the benefit for society as a whole (imperfect 
appropriability). Because of these market failures, private investment in cleantech will 
be below the socially optimal level.37  
 An extensive body of literature suggests that the state should intervene to 
mitigate these market failures, and implement a dual policy strategy based on installing 
both a ‘demand-pull’ and a ‘supply-push’ for environmental innovations. The first 
consists of affecting the direction of innovation, by pricing pollution and providing an 
incentive for firms to conduct cleantech R&D. A ‘supply push’ for energy innovations 
is achieved by affecting the magnitude of the specific R&D, primarily through the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 For example, past research have established the private rate of return on energy innovation to 
be between 7 percent and 15 percent (Hall, 1996), and the social rate of return to range from 30 
percent to 50 percent (Mansfield, 1977). 
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public funding of cleantech R&D (Popp, 2010). The literature demonstrates the need for 
governments to conduct both types of policies at the same time, in order for cleantech 
innovation to take place (Popp, 2006; Fischer, 2008; Fischer and Newell, 2008).38 
Indeed, pricing carbon emissions is required to ensure the diffusion of clean 
technologies once these are available, while R&D subsidisation is a must in order for 
these technologies to develop in the first place (Acemoglu et al., 2009). The evidence 
points to the fact that Finland has adopted such a dual strategy, with some success.  
 Initiating a demand-pull for clean technologies involves incorporating pollution 
in firms’ cost structures. Policies that internalize the cost of pollution and raise energy 
prices increase the return on adopting low carbon-intensive technology, improve their 
demand, and enhance the profitability of developing them (Jaffer et al., 2004). 
Regulation thereby induces innovation that would otherwise not have been profitable, 
and acts as a key driver of growth for environmental business (Popp, 2002). Regulators 
can achieve this using market-based instruments, which directly (taxes) or indirectly 
(tradable permits) set a price for emissions. Subsidies and tax credit schemes also 
constitute an interesting tool for regulators. Authorities can thereby provide a reward for 
environmental quality that is often successful in generating innovation (Magat, 1978). 
In the case of market-based instruments, firms undertake pollution mitigation efforts 
that are in their own interest, depending on their marginal cost of abating emissions. 
Market-based instruments are especially important for the diffusion of cleantech, as 
they provide incentives for firms to adopt the technology resulting from previously 
undertaken R&D (Stavins, 2003). Regulators can also implement command-and-control 
measures. Performance and technology standards can be used, for example, to force 
firms to abate emissions by a non-negotiable amount or to adopt specific cleantech. All 
these instruments have their own advantages and drawbacks, in terms of their impact on 
cleantech innovation. In effect, the optimal choice of instruments varies in function of 
circumstances (Fischer et al., 2003). If efficiently implemented, environmental 
regulation does not have to be a heavy burden for the private sector, and can even help 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Popp (2006), for instance, shows that subsidising R&D on its own brings only 11 percent of 
the social benefits of a policy combining R&D subsidies with pollution taxes.  	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firms be more efficient and increase their competiveness (Porter and van der Linde, 
1995; Repetto, 1995).39 
 In Finland, a demand-pull for cleantech is orchestrated thanks to state measures 
affecting energy production, energy use, and transport. The policy instruments used to 
decrease emissions in the energy sector are the EU ETS, as well as national measures to 
increase the use of renewable energy (biomass, hydro and wind) and improve energy 
efficiency. Emissions resulting from the use of energy are largely covered by the EU 
ETS, and so this supranational tradable permits system is the main instrument at work 
to reduce emissions in this sector. Additionally, nearly all emissions from industrial 
processes are included in the EU ETS. In fact, this permit system covered roughly 55 
percent of total Finnish GHG emissions in the 2008-2012 period (Ministry of the 
Environment and Statistics Finland, 2013: 41). National measures include taxes, 
investment subsidies, and feed-in tariffs. Energy taxation, for example, generates EUR 
4,000 million annually in Finland, which represents as much as 10 percent of total 
government tax revenue (Ministry of the Environment and Statistics Finland, 2013: 
137). Coal, natural gas, peat, oil, and liquid fuels are all subject to energy taxes. 
Electricity used by industry is taxed at a lower rate compared to the electricity used in 
the commercial and residential sectors, to limit the effect of energy taxation on 
competiveness. Policies concerning renewables also play an important role in affecting 
the price of electricity.40 The use of renewables is currently encouraged through feed-in 
tariffs, which are available for forest chips, wind, biogas and wood-fuelled power 
plants.41  
 In addition, energy efficiency measures apply to all areas of the economy, and 
include economic incentives in the form of taxes and subsidies, as well as voluntary 
schemes and building regulations for new structures.42 Energy efficiency standards for 
buildings were tightened by 30 percent in 2008, and further increased by 20 percent in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Repetto (1995), for example, found that between 1970 and 1990 American industries 
operating under stringent environmental standards experienced a lower loss of their share of 
world exports. 
40 For a detailed account of measures concerning energy and renewables, see ‘Finland's national 
action plan for promoting energy from renewable sources pursuant to Directive 2009/28/EC’ 
(Prime Minister’s Office, 2010). 
 41 Act on Production Subsidy for Electricity Produced from Renewable Energy Sources (2011), 
and Government Decree on Production Subsidy for Electricity Produced from Renewable 
Energy Sources (2011). 
42 For a detailed account of measures concerning energy efficiency, see Energy Efficiency 
Policies and Measures in Finland in 2012 (Motiva, 2012). 
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2012.43 In terms of waste management, efficiency is sought out using taxes (EUR 50/t) 
and restrictions aimed at decreasing the amount of waste ending up in landfills.44 In the 
transport sector, the state has implemented a series of measures promoting the use of 
biofuels, with the aim to replace 12.5 percent of fossil fuels in transport with biofuels by 
2020.45 Moreover, new vehicle taxation entered into force in 2011, taxing users between 
EUR 43 and EUR 606 each year depending on their car’s carbon emissions. Taxation is 
combined with communication campaigns, with schemes such as the energy label for 
cars helping consumers choose their car in function of its fuel consumption and carbon 
emissions. In line with the EU strategy, the Finnish state also intends to increase the 
share of biofuels used in aviation to 40 percent by 2050.  
 A demand-pull for cleantech is further encouraged through extensive public 
procurement of environmental goods and services. In 2010, total public procurement 
was about EUR 35 billion, amounting to as much as 19 percent of Finnish GDP 
(ymparisto.fi, 2013: para. 1). By setting strict emissions standards for its operations, and 
adopting cleantech wherever possible, the state can act as a promoter and consumer of 
cleantech solutions. In fact, the Finnish state is committed to procure cleantech 
solutions worth at least EUR 300 million (ymparisto.fi, 2013: para. 5): 
The public sector shall promote cleantech solutions, placing an emphasis on the creation 
and implementation of first references in all its procurements, but particularly in 
construction, the energy sector, transport and waste management. […] The Government 
requires that, in all government procurements, the goal is a comprehensive solution, 
which promotes energy and environmental goals and utilises cleantech solutions in the 
most economically advantageous way (Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 2013: 
1). 
This impact can be considerable, especially since the government can ask municipalities 
to take cleantech solutions into account in their procurement choices as well. Therefore, 
through environmental regulation, the Finnish state encourages the demand for 
cleantech and allows for a competitive cleantech sector.  
 The literature shows that the government must also instigate a supply-push of 
cleantech innovations, that is fund cleantech R&D and work to make cleantech R&D 
more attractive for investors. In the case of cleantech, R&D has a large element of 
public good and there is consequently a gap between the level beneficial for society and 
the level the private sector is willing to conduct (Nakicenovic, 1997). Indeed, Cleantech 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Directive on the Energy Performance of Buildings (2008; 2012). 
44 Waste Tax Act (2011), and Government decree on landfills (revised in 2012). 
45 Climate Policy Programme for the Transport Sector (2011).	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R&D yields long-term and uncertain payoffs, and firms usually choose to focus on 
developing technologies with greatest commercial potential (Popp, 2010). Yet cleantech 
R&D has the potential to bring about significant social benefits, and so the public sector 
must step in and undertake the R&D activity (Jaffe et al., 2004). This paper discussed 
previously the extensive public R&D funding in Finland in the 1990s, which drove 
innovation in the ICT sector. Evidence points to the fact that such a strategy has been 
continued in the 21st century. In 2012, Finland’s R&D spending amounted to 3.55 
percent of GDP, well above the EU average of 2 percent (Eurostat). In fact, this was the 
third largest share in the world after Sweden and Israel. In 2009, this share was nearly 4 
percent, far larger than at any point in the 1990s or early 2000s. Furthermore, in terms 
of R&D expenditure per capita, Finland has the highest share in the world.  
 In 2011, 66 percent of R&D spending came from the private sector, and 28 
percent from the public sector (Ministry of the Environment and Statistics Finland, 
2013: 229). Finland therefore still benefits from high governmental support for R&D, 
and public R&D investments in 2011 amounted to 1.2 percent of GDP. In parallel, 
R&D personnel has been increasing since 2001, and in 2008 Finland had the highest 
number of researchers per thousand people employed amongst OECD countries 
(Academy of Finland, 2012: 34). The areas of energy and climate change have been 
identified as priority recipients of state-funded research since 2007. In total, the budget 
for energy and climate policies likely amounted to EUR 506 million in 2013, up from 
an estimated EUR 469 million the year before (Ministry of the Environment and 
Statistics Finland, 2013: 140).  	   The Prime Minister’s Office and the Research and Innovation Council play the 
central roles with regards to R&D policymaking today. Government funding is then 
distributed amongst a few key institutions, which have specific investment roles. In 
2012, universities were the most important receivers of public R&D funding (29 
percent, or EUR 583 million), in front of Tekes (28 percent), the Academy of Finland 
(16 percent) and government research institutes (15 percent) (Academy of Finland, 
2012: 14). Tekes’ role, as an institution working with private companies, was 
mentioned previously in the paper. Yet Tekes is also a major source of financing for 
research institutions. In 2011, for instance, out of the total Tekes research funding of 
EUR 610 million, EUR 251 million were distributed to HEIs and public research 
institutes (Tekes, 2012: 43). In terms of public environmental and cleantech R&D in 
particular, the most important institution is arguably the Academy of Finland, which 
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coordinates Finnish research platforms. In fact, the Academy has funded over one 
hundred projects since its first Finnish Research Programme on Climate Change 
(SILMU, 1990-1995). Currently, the Academy undertakes climate change research 
under a new Finnish Research Programme on Climate Change (FICCA, 2011-2014), 
with a total funding of EUR 21 million (Ministry of the Environment and Statistics 
Finland, 2013: 235).  
 By 2010, Finland spent more in public energy and climate change R&D as a 
percentage of its GDP (0.16 percent) than any other OECD country, although spending 
has fallen slight from EUR 270 million that year to EUR 255 million in 2011 (Ministry 
of the Environment and Statistics Finland, 2013: 230). In 2013, energy technology 
R&D is estimated to have been the second largest environment-related public 
investment area (EUR 176 million), just behind public subsidies for cleantech (EUR 
230 million). This illustrates well the ongoing supply-push for cleantech innovations in 
Finland, instigated by a state committed to undertaking extensive cleantech R&D and 
assisting firms in their own R&D&I activities. This paper therefore argues that two key 
aspects of Finnish economic policymaking that existed in the 1990s still hold true at 
present day. Firstly, the regulatory environment is established with great consideration 
of potential impacts on the private sector, as well as the needs of Finnish firms. In 
effect, state intervention is once again aimed at instigating economy-wide growth by 
improving the competiveness of private companies involved in an emerging sector. 
Secondly, public funding for R&D is once again exceptional in parallel, to further 
facilitate the shift of the Finnish economy in a new direction. 
  
 To conclude, this section has shown that five features of the Finnish society that 
played a key role in the ‘Finnish miracle’ of ICT have the potential to facilitate the 
climate change mitigation effort in Finland. Because of these Finnish characteristics, 
there is hope that Finland will manage to rally society behind its climate change 
mitigation strategy, and in the process specialise in a new industrial sector with positive 
ramifications for its economic future. The next section, however, outlines a few issues 
within the Finnish society that challenge Finland’s climate change mitigation 
aspirations. The ambition in the following chapter is not to provide an in-depth 
assessment of the situation, which goes beyond the scope of this thesis. The aim will be 
to show that, although Finland is potentially well suited to deal with the issue at hand, 
this potential has not yet been fully exploited in practice.  
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Chapter III. Addressing the challenges 
 
 
1. Finland’s climate change mitigation effort: achieving clear results? 
  
 
 First and foremost, it must be noted that Finland has not yet achieved clear 
results from its climate change mitigation effort. Finland typically benefits from a good 
environmental image, yet strong environmental protection does not apply to carbon 
emissions at the moment (Ministry of the Environment, 2009: 68). In reality, Finland’s 
GHG emissions per capita are still relatively high, amongst the highest in Europe.46 It is 
true that emissions levels have significantly fallen in the last few years in Finland, and 
they currently stand at historically low levels (SYKE, 2014: 26). However, this 
reduction is largely attributable to reduced output as a result of the economic crisis, 
even though governmental reports often fail to mention this reality. Consequently, it is 
not yet possible to present the evidence that Finland is pursuing a successful climate 
change mitigation strategy. In addition, the short-term ambitions of Finland’s climate 
change policies are relatively weak in light of the country’s significant emissions per 
capita. Although governmental reports also tend to inaccurately portray this fact, it is 
well recognised by diverse Finnish actors involved with climate change. For example, a 
rather critical examination was provided by two actors I contacted:  
Finland is not doing enough. Finland has decided to cut down carbon emissions by 20 
percent by 2020, while that amount should be at least 40 percent based on the IPPC 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, A/N) reports. Finland should also urge the 
EU to commit to more stringent emission reductions. […] If Finland and the EU had 
more stringent climate strategies, they would also have more weight in international 
negotiations. […] We cannot reach an international climate agreement in 2015 if we (and 
other nations) are not ready to commit to cutting down emissions. Finland should commit 
to cutting down emissions by 40 percent by 2020, and we need a binding “Climate Act” 
(ilmastolaki) to guide this reduction in emissions. 
Liisa Selvenius-Hurme, chairperson of Ilmastovanhemmat. 
The 2020 targets can hardly be considered ambitious, let alone the Kyoto 2008-12 targets. 
The observed reduction in carbon emissions is mostly due to the recession. Energy 
efficiency is by far the cheapest and most sustainable tool to reduce emissions so we 
should be doing way more in that field. Climate change is and continues to be a serious 
issue. Finland is among the least directly threatened by climate change, but indirect 
impacts will be mostly negative and could be considerable. […] We have several 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 For an international comparison, see for example the World Bank’s CO2 emissions estimates. 
Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC 	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strengths, including the ones you listed [a strong and well-accepted state, socially 
responsible citizens, good education and know-how, and multi-stakeholder 
collaboration]. However, our political ability and willingness to show leadership in global 
efforts is rather limited. 
Oras Tynkkynen, member of the Finnish Parliament. 
 Several factors explain Finland’s high GHG emissions, and pose a real challenge 
to any climate change strategy in the country. First of all, low population density and 
the significant size of Finland (Europe’s seventh largest country) result in long distance 
travelled for transport. Secondly, the Finnish climate is relatively cold, the yearly 
average temperature in Finland’s warmest region being only 5.5 degrees Celsius 
(Ministry of the Environment and Statistics Finland, 2013: 33). High standards of living 
in the country further explain important energy consumption (Ministry of the 
Environment, 2009: 40). Finally, heavy industries are very important for Finland’s 
economy, and these are typically energy intensive. These factors explain why the 
energy sector, still significantly relying on the combustion of fossil fuels and peat, 
accounts for 80 percent of total GHG emissions in Finland (Ministry of the 
Environment and Statistics Finland, 2013: 61). They also explain why in terms of 
energy use in 2011, industry was by far the largest source of demand (47 percent), 
followed by heating (24 percent), transport (17 percent) and other purposes (12 percent) 
(Ministry of the Environment and Statistics Finland, 2013: 40). With reference to 
transport, only Norway has higher per capita carbon emissions from transport than 
Finland amongst EU countries. Problematically, 83 percent of total passenger-
kilometres travel was undertaken by car in Finland in 2011, and road transport was 
responsible for 88 percent of total transport emissions (Ministry of the Environment and 
Statistics Finland, 2013: 42). With respect to heating, the increasing number of houses 
(28 percent rise between 1990 and 2011) as well as the mean size of houses has pushed 
energy requirements for heating upwards (Ministry of the Environment and Statistics 
Finland, 2013: 45).  In effect, heating is the biggest source of carbon emissions from 
households and from the service and public sectors. GHG emissions levels actually vary 
significantly from year to year in Finland, depending on the economic situation of 
heavy industries and the weather, in addition to the share of imported electricity. This 
goes to show the considerable impact of these factors on national emissions. In fact, one 
can argue that high energy use is important to the wellbeing of the Finnish population, 
and so reducing emissions is always going to be difficult in this country, even if there 
was a generalised will to do so. This point is well illustrated by one respondent: 
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The strengths you mentioned are there [a strong and well-accepted state, etc.]. But 
Finland is using and needing energy a lot: heating demand, lighting demand, relatively 
sparse country (5.4 million in a relatively big country) and most importantly, a very high 
share of energy intensive industry. It is a fact that Finnish paper factories produce paper 
for about a 100 million people to use and stainless steel for about 50 million people’s 
needs. 
Timo Ritonummi, Ministry of Employment and the Economy.	  
 In these conditions, it is difficult for Finns to change their lifestyles and adopt 
less energy-intensive habits. This strengthens the role and responsibility of the 
government, particularly with respect to encouraging the production of energy from 
renewable sources and the diffusion of cleantech in Finland. For example, high energy 
consumption during the winter must be compensated by greater energy efficiency, and 
improved insulation of infrastructures in particular. One testimony included above 
points to the fact that Finland has room for improvement in this area. Transport realities 
must be met with a faster renewal of the transport stock, and greater adoption of cleaner 
fuels. The share of electric cars in Finland is very low, for instance, and the government 
has a considerable role to play by installing the infrastructure allowing for their use. 
Since recently, the bus fleet in the Helsinki metropolitan area runs on Metso biofuels. 
This demonstrates signs of progress in the area of transport, and a will to stimulate the 
demand for Finnish cleantech. Such changes must be accelerated however, and 
implemented on a nation-wide basis. All in all, evidence points to the fact that the 
diffusion and adoption of cleantech in Finland is rather low, and the replacement of 
fossil fuels by renewables rather slow. The Finnish government needs to actively 
reverse this trend, as further discussed later on in this paper. 	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2. Climate change mitigation: widespread societal support? 
 
 
 Claiming that there is currently a widespread will to act on global warming in 
Finland is further problematic in practice. This reality is well presented by the people I 
contacted on the matter, and their responses shed light on several key issues. The first is 
that it is commonly believed within the Finnish society that Finland will not be heavily 
impacted by climate change, and that global warming may even come to have mostly 
positive effects for Finland and its economy.  
I would say that many Finns think that climate change is something that does not affect 
them and something they cannot do anything about. […] It seems that Finland’s 
policymakers (and many other Finnish people) are not fully aware of the consequences of 
climate change. Some of them seem to think Finland can actually benefit from a changing 
climate.  
Liisa Selvenius-Hurme 
There are indeed reasons to believe that Finland could reap economic benefits from a 
warmer climate in the short-run, although reports show that the overall effect will be 
negative in the long-term, and possibly significantly so (e.g. SYKE, 2014).47 Whether 
this belief is justified or not, it can have a significant role in slowing down 
policymaking and change in citizen behaviours. Likewise, there is widespread belief 
that Finland, due to its very small population, has very little impact on climate change 
and its mitigation. 
Climate policy is not slowed down as much by the lack of climate change impacts as it is 
by the myth that a small country like Finland cannot do anything. 
Oras Tynkkynen 
This may further hinder climate policymaking and behavioural change, as it weakens 
the notion of Finnish responsibility towards other countries and encourages 
individualistic behaviours. In addition to this issue, it is commonly believed that Finland 
already implements an ambitious climate change mitigation strategy, which is debatable 
as mentioned previously.  
Somehow Finnish policymakers have managed to get people to think that Finland is a 
“good guy” or a trendsetter in climate politics, when in fact Finland is far behind many 
other European countries. […] It is also quite commonly believed that Finland is doing 
it’s best and it is China and the USA that are to blame. 
Liisa Selvenius-Hurme 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 For a detailed account of the possible impacts of climate change on the Finnish economy, see 
‘The impacts of climate change on Finland’s economy’ (climateguide.fi, 2012). 
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The common misconception that Finland is already a world leader in tackling climate 
change, which it clearly is not, is unhelpful.  
Oras Tynkkynen 
If citizens believe that policymakers are already being tough on emissions, they are less 
likely to demand further efforts from their government. Additionally, there are reasons 
to believe that Finns are perhaps not particularly well informed about global warming, 
and this may further restrain their demand for tougher polices as well as their will to 
take personal action. 
I would say Finns are not very well aware or concerned about global warming. […] In my 
opinion, people should be more aware of the consequences of climate change. If that were 
the case, they would be more willing to cut down their own carbon emissions and to 
demand better decisions from policymakers. […] I think that at the moment Finns are not 
really willing to change their lifestyle. Opinions are changing, but the change is not 
taking place very fast.  
Liisa Selvenius-Hurme 
This claim is supported by Koivisto (2008), who finds that most of the Finnish 
respondents in his study did not consider climate change as a serious issue. In addition, 
only a very small proportion of respondents believed that that the most serious 
consequence of exhaust gases (14.5 percent) and energy production (34.4 percent) was 
climate change (Koivisto, 2008: 126).  
 Recently, the economic downturn has lessened the relative seriousness of 
climate change in the minds of many Finns. Geels (2012) shows that the financial crisis 
has had the adverse effect of shifting the attention and priorities of Europeans away 
from environmental issues. The study shows that attention for environmental issues in 
Europe peaked in 2007, and then dropped from 2008 onwards. Since then, economic 
and social issues have gained a foothold in the public debate, and Geels concludes that 
these problems compete for attention (Geels, 2012: 89). In turn, public pressure on 
policymakers weakens when citizen focus shifts away from the climate change issue. 
This observation holds true in the case of Finland at present day. Finland was hard hit 
by the global economic crisis; growth and employment are still quite low today despite 
improvements. The issue of climate change, which evolves relatively slowly and with 
serious consequences only in the distant future, appears relatively less important to 
many Finns. One study indeed shows that this year climate change is deemed by Finns 
to be the third most serious issue at present, having fallen from second place and behind 
the economic situation since 2011 (Teivainen, 2014: para. 7). The same survey confirms 
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that Finns are less concerned about climate change than the European average, giving it 
a 6.6 average ‘seriousness’ score out of ten, against a European average of 7.3 
(Teivainen, 2014: para. 3). Interestingly, the study further finds that Finns are sceptical 
about the economic opportunities linked to the mitigation of climate change, with only 
21 percent claiming economic growth and employment can be promoted while 
combating the issue. In addition, Halder (2011) finds that although Finnish students 
have good knowledge of bioenergy and renewable energies, they tend to be very critical 
towards their use. Indeed, respondents in his study generally disagreed with the positive 
attributes of bioenergy, such as its potential to mitigate global warming or to replace 
fossil fuels in the future. If Finns are not greatly concerned about their personal impact 
on emissions, as well as sceptical towards the possible solutions available to mitigate 
this impact, this may significant hinder the scope of government measures to instigate 
more environmentally conscious behaviours. Moreover, the literature shows that the 
media is the most important source of information on climate change in Finland, and 
that the media has a significant impact on citizen perceptions in relation to this issue 
(Koivisto, 2008; Halder, 2011; Teräväinen, 2011). Government communications and the 
schooling system are relatively less important, which somewhat questions the potential 
for these institutions to influence citizen behaviours. In fact, one assessment report 
observes:  
Consumption habits have not changed significantly in recent years. Thus, changing 
consumption habits by affecting attitudes and awareness seems insufficient (Ministry of 
the Environment, 2009: 45).  
 Therefore, the government must improve its communication strategy if it wants 
to instigate real changes in citizen behaviours. It would appear that the ‘rhetoric of 
possibility’, presented previously, is successful in securing public support for the 
development of cleantech in Finland, but not for raising awareness on climate change 
and the need to deal with the issue today. In terms of the Finish model, therefore, it 
would appear that the cohesive nature of the Finnish society does not result in as much 
societal support for the current climate change mitigation effort as for the switch to an 
information economy in the 1990s. However, there are also claims that the state is to 
blame in this respect, and that the public is not given enough voice in climate 
policymaking (Pelkonen, 2008; Teräväinen, 2012). Ruostetsaari (2009) further shows 
that Finns are very sceptical as to their chance to influence energy policy, and many 
believe that their opinion has not been taken sufficiently into account in energy policy 
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decisions (Ruostetsaari, 2009: 109). In effect, the evidence points to the fact that the 
traditional corporatist model of government-industry relations in Finland leaves very 
little room for the inclusion of citizens and for their influence on energy and climate 
policies. This issue is presented in greater detail in the following section. 
	  
3. Climate change policymaking: obvious commitments? 
 
 Evidence shows that issues are associated with the development of state climate 
mitigation strategies in Finland. First of all, there are claims that Finland’s climate 
change mitigation effort is rather weak, and that economic problems continue to be 
given priority in policymaking. This could explain the issues raised earlier that 
Finland’s strategy has yet to demonstrate clear results, and that carbon emissions are 
still relatively high in the country. Pelkonen (2008), for instance, has criticized the 
governmental efforts for being largely focused on fostering R&D&I, associated with a 
strong societal consensus for building a knowledge-based economy. It is not clear, 
however, what other means are implemented to promote sustainable development, and 
Pelkonen recommends that innovation policy should be coordinated with other policy 
aims such as climate change mitigation (Pelkonen, 2008: 68). Likewise, Hjelt et al. 
(2006) criticise the fact that there is no clear separate sustainable development policy in 
Finland. The authors claim that objectives are clearly stated, as well as the role of 
relevant institutions, but there is no evident political willpower to implement measures 
to reach the stated objectives. In effect, sustainable development has somewhat been 
integrated in innovation policy goals, but it is neither the priority nor the final aim. The 
aim has remained to spur economic growth and the exploitation of new business 
opportunities, Hjelt et al. conclude (Hjelt et al., 2006: 204). 
 Teräväinen (2010) also sees energy policy as part of a wider policy aimed at 
maintaining and enhancing Finnish competiveness and economic growth. 
Problematically, new ideas of ecological modernisation are conflicting with the 
traditional structure of government-industry relations in the energy sector. On the one 
hand, the state emphasises the economic opportunities that could materialise thanks to a 
technology-led sustainable development path. On the other hand, however, the 
established structure constrains the development of innovative cleantech. Therefore, the 
governmental rhetoric seems to conflict with the observed reality. Teräväinen (2010) 
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argues that R&D&I efforts in cleantech are used by the government as an argument that 
competiveness and climate change efforts will be combined, but in reality the 
competiveness of industry is still given priority. Resource allocation for technical fields 
is biased towards particular areas, and cleantech with the potential to raise costs for 
industry (e.g. renewables) do not receive as much support (Teräväinen, 2010: 416). 
Generally, emphasis is placed on inexpensive market-based instruments and voluntary 
energy efficiency measures for industry, instead of binding emissions reduction 
obligations. Teräväinen therefore hints towards the reality that the state strategy mainly 
involves a supply-push of innovations, rather than a convincing demand-pull generated 
by strong regulation. Indeed, there is considerable support for the development of 
cleantech innovations in Finland but far less for their utilisation, which remains at a low 
level (Teräväinen, 2010: 417). This reality is well illustrated by one cleantech 
entrepreneur I contacted:  
The Ministry of the Environment should get more authority to stipulate laws and 
regulations, taxes and adverse taxes, subsidies etc. […] I think the government would 
have the possibility to do something radical to help cleantech startup companies get 
going. With different means like polluter pays, subsidies, laws and regulations, higher 
energy cost but most of all by buying small companies’ products and services in the 
context of national development programs. 
Feodor Aminoff, CEO of Ultranat. 
 This issue was already raised by Hjelt et al. (2006) several years earlier. Indeed, 
the report claims that the Finnish state focuses on spurring cleantech innovations, but 
the spread of innovations is not adequately encouraged through regulation and policies. 
Similarly, research is extensively conducted yet the research output is not well utilised 
(Hjelt et al., 2006: 211). The government strategy is therefore more an innovation 
policy aimed at developing new cleantech, rather than an environmental policy aimed at 
encouraging the adoption of cleantech and the subsequent abatement of carbon 
emissions. Similarly, increases in energy taxation have been targeted at energy 
consumption rather than energy production, again in an effort to maintain the 
competiveness of key industries (Teräväinen, 2012: 86). Teräväinen further argues that 
climate change policies are aimed at inducing export growth and maintaining Finland’s 
international competiveness, rather than decreasing national emissions (Teräväinen, 
2012: 85). Consequently, public investment in renewables aims to increase their export 
rather than national utilisation. In addition, energy policies favour large-scale power 
plants (coal, nuclear, and biomass) over dispersed energy sources such as wind. This is 
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arguably one reason explaining the bankruptcy of WinWinD, a large Finnish producer of 
wind turbines, in late 2013. In light of the recent downturn in the growth of the global 
renewable energies market, it is particularly important for governments to be supportive 
of this industry nowadays. This necessity is well portrayed in a press release explaining 
WinWinD’s decision to file for bankruptcy:   
WinWinD has been incurring heavy losses for the past several years and the company’s 
debts are currently close to 300 million euros. The efforts of WinWinD in trying to 
arrange for necessary funding and approval for restructuring process has not been 
successful and hence this decision.48	   
 In effect, the corporatist structure of government presented earlier in the paper 
still holds true today, and has strongly conditioned energy policy. Problematically, the 
collaboration between the state and economically important industries has hindered 
strong climate change policymaking (Teräväinen, 2010; 2012). This constitutes a 
significant difference as compared to the situation in the 1990s, when collaboration was 
spurring progress, on the contrary. According to Teräväinen (2010), the problem is 
twofold. Firstly, public energy companies have traditionally dominated the energy 
production and distribution markets in Finland. In fact, the two state-owned companies 
Fortum and Neste Oil occupy nearly the whole market. One can therefore wonder if 
maximizing the share price of these firms is not a separate objective for the state. In 
addition, the state holds a large ownership of nuclear energy production. Consequently, 
the Ministry Employment and the Economy is both the entity responsible for energy 
policymaking, including implementing measures with respect to renewables, and an 
actor significantly involved in the traditional energy sector through its ownership of 
companies. There are claims that this structure potentially results in a conflict of interest 
in terms of energy policymaking, and an underinvestment of public resources in 
renewable energies (Lampinen, 2009: 41). Secondly, negotiations allows for a good 
representation of industrial interests within the government, and consequently the 
impact of large industrial actors on policymaking. Problematically, the literature shows 
that large industrial groups tend to resist change when it comes to climate 
policymaking, as they have vested interest in the existing structure (e.g. Levy and 
Newell, 2000). Such influence appears to have materialised in Finland, and there are 
concerns that energy policy in Finland may be biased towards the production of energy 
from nuclear and coal sources, instead of encouraging the development of renewables, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Quote taken from the Hesinki Times website (Cord, 2013: para. 3). 
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as a result. This illustrates a clear difference between the development of cleantech 
today and ICT growth in the 1990s: While ICT had the potential to satisfy all parties 
involved in its development, cleantech challenge the existing system and consequently 
lack the support of key actors.  
 In terms of renewables, the focus has largely been on developing bioenergy, 
which has the merit of benefiting the historically strong forest industry. In effect, the 
task of increasing the share of renewables is awarded to this industry, and this justifies 
the support it receives. A recent government report on climate change states for 
example:  
Increasing the use of forest chips in multi-fuel boilers is the most central and cost-
efficient way of increasing the use of renewable energy in the generation of power and 
heat. […] The use of forest chips will replace the use of other fuels (mainly peat) in heat 
and power production and heating oil on farms. […] The National Energy and Climate 
Strategy (2013) also contains more than just economic measures to promote renewables, 
especially biomass. These include improving the logistics for harvesting and transporting 
forest chips and furthering the emergence of local heat entrepreneurs (Ministry of the 
Environment and Statistics Finland, 2013: 112-13). 
More generally, the consensus seeking ideal in Finland has led to the preparation of a 
strategy with the input of diverse actors, and the ambition to avoid open conflict. In 
practice, this has led the government to avoid the implementation of radical changes, in 
the aim of sustaining the existing industrial system and economic growth (Teräväinen, 
2012). This issue has been raised by one of my respondents:  
I am not really hopeful [as to the Finnish cleantech environment]. I think the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy is the wrong place to take care of the green strategy. 
Indeed, it counteracts its main role: to create new jobs and get more taxes. Green means 
using less energy and materials, which means less jobs. 
Feodor Aminoff, CEO of Ultranat. 
This testimony confirms the suspicion that issues are associated with the division of 
responsibilities in Finnish environmental policymaking, and that economic realities are 
often given priority in practice. This reality further limits Finland’s capability to rapidly 
deal with the issues at hand. With reference to the Finnish model, it would therefore 
seem that the policy environment nowadays is not quite as favourable to the 
development of cleantech as it was to ICT in the late 1990s. The state should therefore 
further grasp the long-run benefits that an internationally competitive cleantech industry 
would bring for Finland, and accelerate the structural shift towards this new industrial 
sector. This entails the implementation of more binding environmental regulation, 
despite potential short-term adverse economic consequences.  
72	  
4. The climate change strategy: effective implementation? 
 
 
 Some criticisms have also been raised as to the implementation of Finland’s 
climate change strategy. First of all, the fragmentation of the climate change strategy, 
and subsequent responsibilities, between several ministries is problematic as a clear 
political strategy is lacking (Teräväinen, 2012). For example, the Ministry of the 
Environment is in charge of coordinating the national climate change strategy, but the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy oversees energy policymaking. In practice, 
the two areas are strongly intertwined and cooperation mechanisms linking the 
ministries are imperfect. Likewise, Hjelt et al. (2006) claim that different ministries, and 
even different departments within ministries, deal with similar issues without 
coordinating with each other. In parallel, the Finnish National Commission on 
Sustainable Development (FNCSD) fails to instigate real cooperation between 
governmental actors (Hjelt et al., 2006: 201). In addition, the report finds that a lot of 
power is left to individual agencies and regional centres, including the allocation of 
national R&D funding. Problematically, no national implementation agency is focused 
on sustainable development and so the task is left to agencies with priorities other than 
environmental issues, such as Tekes (Hjelt et al., 2006: 206). This thesis further finds 
that the role of several funding institutions, such as Tekes and Sitra, is overlapping in 
practice. Even the name of these two agencies - Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation 
(Tekes) and Finnish Innovation Fund (Sitra) - are now extremely similar. One can 
wonder if the national innovation system could not benefit from a clearer and more 
efficient division of responsibilities between funding institutions. 
 A more recent report also argues that a broader perspective on sustainable 
development is needed, in order for measures to take into account the diverse 
implications (environmental, social, and economic) of a climate change strategy 
(Ministry of the Environment, 2009: 23). At the moment, the report claims that 
environmental implications are dealt separately from economic ones, for instance, and 
potential conflict between targets is not well considered. In addition, target setting is 
rather vague, resulting from a flexible interpretation of sustainable development and 
allowing for a wide range of measures seen as promoting sustainable development 
(Ministry of the Environment, 2009: 24). A programme, clearly linking targets with 
relevant measures, should be formulated (Ministry of the Environment, 2009: 33). One 
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report further criticises the slow public R&D funding process in Finland, which cannot 
keep up with the pace of innovation in the private sector (Sitra, 2008). Additionally, the 
clustering of activities has not been fully successful in encouraging entrepreneurship, 
with most of the activity being directed at larger firms. Low entrepreneurial activity is 
outlined in this report, and the prevalence of large and historically strong firms is seen 
as a weakness of the Finnish economy (Sitra, 2008: 116).  
 With respect to cleantech in particular, there are reasons to believe that good 
financing is available for product development, but that far less assistance is provided 
for the commercialisation of products (Sitra, 2007: 21). This claim supports the 
previously presented view that that the climate change mitigation strategy in Finland is 
mostly concerned with spurring innovation, rather than the utilization of cleantech that 
results from this innovation effort. This opinion is shared by three entrepreneurs I 
contacted: 
I’d have to say [there is no real desire in the Finnish society to develop and implement 
cleantech innovations]. Many companies are for it in principle but lack the resources, 
vision and courage to innovate in sustainable solutions, especially for consumer markets.  
Jonne Hellgren, CEO of RePack. 
It is well supported to invent a new technology in Finland, but not so well supported to 
get it commercialised. The home market is really small so it would be easier to have a 
bigger home market and one that is supporting the commercial side of cleantech, like 
Germany does.  
Feodor Aminoff, CEO of Ultranat. 
I developed Solixi because I assumed there was a need for a free, domestic and clean 
energy. I was wrong. The organisations whose mission is to promote renewable energy 
and innovation have been a surprising obstacle. Their approach has been mediocre, 
negative, passive and bureaucratic, which in particular prevented the commercialisation 
of Solixi and revenue making. […] My company has financed the development of ideas, 
patenting, product development and prototypes completely (about EUR 100,000). 
Funding has been applied only to international patenting (about EUR 20,000), in 
September 2012. 
Jyri Jaakkola, CEO of Solixi.49 
These accounts point towards the fact that marketing cleantech innovations is often an 
issue for SMEs in Finland, and more governmental support is needed in this area. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Solixi is Finnish startup developing and marketing technologies allowing for the enhanced 
performance of solar panels. The quote was taken from the Solixi website, from a post the 
contacted entrepreneur directed me to for information. It was originally published on 19 May 
2013, and I accessed it on 8 November 2013.  
Note: The post has recently been removed from the website. The entrepreneur has managed to 
secure patenting for his cleantech innovation at the end of 2013, and this may explain why the 
rather pessimistic section has been removed from his company’s website.  
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somewhat goes against the evidence presented previously in this paper that several 
agencies provide good support to cleantech entrepreneurs in Finland. Although all three 
of these entrepreneurs have received government support in their projects, their 
testimony goes to show that in practice this support is not necessarily sufficient or 
efficiently delivered.  
 This reality is confirmed by one survey, which finds that cleantech, and energy 
cleantech in particular, is still in dire need of state support. Indeed, 48 percent of 
respondents in the area of renewable energy, and 40 percent of respondents in the field 
of energy efficiency, claimed to be in need of more public funding (Cleantech Finland 
and Burson-Marsteller, 2013). Insufficient assistance at the commercialisation stage 
may explain why only one Finnish firm, MetGen, made it in the Cleantech Group’s 
Global Cleantech 100 list in 2013.50 Indeed, a firm’s potential to have an impact on the 
market fully depends on its commercialisation ability. It also depends on the 
opportunities it has to easily sell its products, and the testimonies presented previously 
confirm the fact that such opportunities may be lacking in Finland. Therefore, as 
mentioned before, the Finnish state should step in and instigate a greater demand-pull 
for cleantech, through stronger regulation and greater public procurement. On top of 
further developing a strong national market for cleantech, the state should also increase 
its support in key overseas markets, to enhance the internationalisation of Finnish 
cleantech companies and increase their marketing opportunities abroad. 
 Feedback from Finnish cleantech entrepreneurs also reveals the importance of 
the patenting process, and a margin for improvement with respect to this particular step:  
It difficult and lengthy to secure patenting, but it’s an ongoing process. You need an IPR 
strategy to realise what can be done and when. The particular issues involved with 
patenting include finding a knowledgeable IPR company to work with, and finding 
funding to pay for their relatively expensive services. 
Jonne Hellgren, CEO of RePack. 
Most startups use patent agencies or agents to file their patents since they do not have 
experience in patenting from before. It is more of a cost but of course it is important to 
file the patent in a wise manner to cover the field as broadly as possible, without risking it 
is too broad to be accepted.  
Feodor Aminoff, CEO of Ultranat. 
Patents are granted by PRH (National Board of Patents and Registration of Finland, A/N) 
when three points are in order: novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability. […] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 This study looks at thousands of private cleantech companies all around the world, and elects 
100 that are ‘the most likely to make the most significant market impact over the next 5-10 
years’ (Cleantech Group, 2013: 8). 
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PRH have rejected my patent demand four times, without explanation and while requiring 
payment. Thousands of dollars and two years have passed and PRH still does not even 
know what parts Solixi consists of, nor do they understand the benefits, not to mention 
the idea. A patent could be obtained elsewhere, yes, but it would be expensive and time-
consuming, and the lost time and expenses cannot be recovered.  
Jyri Jaakkola,	  CEO of Solixi.51 
 The literature demonstrates the importance of patenting for innovation, and in 
the sector of cleantech in particular. Patents allow innovators to profit from their 
invention and gain a competitive advantage, and thereby encourage firms to conduct 
R&D and innovate. Patents can also incite the emergence of new firms exploiting an 
innovation and relying on patenting to reap returns on that innovation. The patenting 
system is particularly important for small start-up firms, and high-tech start-ups in 
particular, which typically can only capitalize on their innovation (Helmers and Rogers, 
2011). In emerging sectors such as cleantech, many firms come up with innovative 
products and processes, and so patenting is particularly important for encouraging 
private investments (Hall and Helmers, 2013). The testimonies above mention 
important costs and other problems linked to the patenting process, and the resulting 
uncertainty and riskiness of developing a cleantech innovation in Finland. Public 
institutions should therefore provide more assistance to cleantech start-ups in the 
procurement of patents, and work to decrease the costs and delivery times. This could 
have a considerable impact on the will and ability of Finnish cleantech SMEs to develop 
and market innovations. Consequently, it would appear that, in terms of the Finnish 
model, issues associated with public-private partnerships today (on top of the nature of 
cleantech themselves) result in the lower attractiveness of cleantech for private 
investors, as compared to ICT in the late 1990s. 
 In 2007, Sitra proposed a ‘national action plan to develop environmental 
business’ (Sitra, 2007). The plan recommended the implementation of four major 
strategies before 2012: ‘Finland – the most well-known cleantech country globally’, 
‘Finland as an optimal platform for the growth of environmental business’, ‘Finnish 
excellence in focus areas’, and ‘most efficient international business networks’. In light 
of the challenges outlined above, it seems that Finland has not performed to 
expectations, and all four aims are still very much unreached. Perhaps the second 
strategy, ‘Finnish excellence in focus areas’, has been pursued with the most success, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Quote taken from the Solixi website, from a post published on May 19, 2013 and accessed on 
November 8, 2013. 
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showed in the first section of Chapter II. Nevertheless, the 2012 ‘Strategic Programme 
for Cleantech’, presented earlier in the paper, shows a will to address the challenges 
identified in this last section (Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 2012). The 
strategy indeed pledges to toughen regulations and increase public procurement (greater 
demand-pull for cleantech), focus funding on the commercialisation stage, and facilitate 
the internationalisation of cleantech SMEs. This paper specifically showed the need for 
improvements in these areas, and regards the inclusion of these points in state strategies 
as a source of hope for the future of the Finnish cleantech sector. 	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Conclusion 
 
 
 Castells and Himanen (2002) themselves expressed their belief in the need to 
explore further the notion of a Finnish model:  
We are simply presenting here an approximate, and schematic representation of our 
hypotheses on the dynamics of the Finish information society, in the hope that 
researchers can take it up, and test these hypotheses more thoroughly, and that those 
interested in the Finnish information society, in Finland and in the world, can achieve a 
better understanding of this rich social, technological, and economic experience (pp. 140-
1). 
This study attempted just that, and innovatively sought to analyse if the Finnish society 
is well suited to deal with major challenges it faces at present, in light of attributes that 
had proven helpful in the past. More precisely, this thesis tested whether the key factors 
that explain Finland’s successful specialisation in ICT may be beneficial to the climate 
change mitigation effort today, and the development of a competitive cleantech industry 
in Finland.  
 In Chapter I, the paper demonstrated the influence of five main factors in the 
rapid development of the ICT sector in the 1990s. (i) The presence of an extensive 
welfare state lessened the impact of the economic changes occurring at the time, which 
in turn helped citizens accept the adjustments involved. The state’s influence on 
industrial relations was particularly important in this respect. (ii) Social cohesion and 
state legitimacy remained high, which guaranteed citizen support for the production and 
consumption of ICT. (iii) Universities effectively contributed to the public and private 
sector effort, by shaping skills, the research focus and citizen behaviours. (iv) Public-
private partnerships, commonly instigated in the Finnish ICT sector, were successful in 
generating innovation and supporting the growth of firms in this industry. (v) A 
favourable policy environment, implemented by the state through a combination of 
public R&D funding and deregulation in key areas, helped the Finnish ICT sector grow 
and become internationally competitive. This paper regards the role played by these 
factors to be unique enough to constitute Finnish characteristics, and jointly justify an 
interpretation of a Finnish model.  
 In Chapter II, this paper sought to apply the model framed in the previous 
section to the ongoing climate change mitigation effort in Finland. The ambition was to 
test if the model applies to the present situation, and if its characteristics still have a role 
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to play today. In effect, this paper found that key Finnish attributes may be beneficial to 
any climate change mitigation effort in this country. (i) The extensive welfare state in 
Finland, through the redistribution of incomes, encourages social equality. In turn, 
income equality has a significant role to play in facilitating climate change 
policymaking, the acceptance by citizens of the sacrifices involved, as well as in 
constraining the squander of resources. (ii) Social cohesion increases the likelihood of 
the cooperative behaviours climate change mitigation relies on, such as recycling at the 
level of the individual, and the implementation of environmentally friendly schemes by 
municipalities. High state legitimacy in Finland further has a role to play in securing 
public support for governmental measures. (iii) As in the 1990s, Finnish universities 
today have the potential to effectively participate in the nation-wide effort, as Finnish 
strong suits in technology and environmental subjects are beneficial for research, 
innovation, and the production of cleantech. The influential education system in Finland 
can bring additional benefits, as universities act as demonstrators of good practices and 
shape the behaviour of young citizens. (iv) Public-private partnerships are already 
widely organised in the cleantech sector, as advised by the economic literature. In fact, 
the Finnish tradition of providing public support for private companies is showing signs 
of successfully encouraging the emergence of cleantech start-ups, and the expansion of 
established cleantech firms. (v) Finally, a policy environment favourable to the 
competiveness of the Finnish cleantech sector has somewhat been implemented once 
more. Indeed, the state has sought to instigate both a demand-pull and a supply-push for 
cleantech innovations, through environmental regulation and the extensive funding of 
R&D.  
 In Chapter III, however, this paper presented some key issues associated with 
the current climate change mitigation effort in Finland. These challenges were identified 
largely thanks to feedback provided by actors currently involved in the climate change 
arena, and in the development of cleantech. (i) Finland’s climate change mitigation 
strategy has yet to produce clear results, and GHG emissions are still relatively high in 
Finland. A few fixed factors largely account for this reality, and the fact that high 
energy use is essential for Finnish welfare at present constitutes a real challenge for any 
strategy seeking to reduce GHG emissions. The state, therefore, has a considerable role 
to play and must accelerate the diffusion of cleantech, as well as the replacement of 
fossil fuels by renewables. (ii) Societal support for the mitigation of climate change is 
far from absolute, as in reality many Finns are not greatly worried about climate change 
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and its implications for Finland. To reverse this trend, the government must improve its 
communication strategy, to increase awareness on the issue and work to instigate real 
change in citizen behaviours. (iii) The state commitment to the mitigation effort is not 
obvious, as the government strategy is mostly concerned with generating cleantech 
innovation rather than implementing strong regulations. In effect, large industrial actors 
have a strong impact on policymaking in Finland, and this somewhat constrains the 
competiveness of the national cleantech sector. More binding regulations must be 
implemented to advance the structural shift towards the production of cleantech. (iv) 
The climate change strategy is not implemented with full effectiveness, partly because a 
comprehensible division of responsibilities within the government is lacking. Most 
problematically, support for cleantech companies is insufficient and many companies 
lack the will and resources to develop cleantech innovations as a result. The government 
should therefore work to increase the demand for cleantech through tougher regulation, 
and provide additional support for firms at the patenting and commercialisation stages. 
All in all, key differences between the development of ICT and the mitigation of climate 
change explain why the characteristics of the Finnish model have yet to be as helpful to 
Finland today as they were in the 1990s. The different implications of the two projects 
for the existing system is particularly important in this respect. 
 Nevertheless, Finland’s strategy is gradually yielding real economic benefits, as 
demonstrated by the emergence of a competitive and rapidly growing cleantech sector 
in the country. As benefits are materialising on several fronts, there is hope that diverse 
parties within the Finnish society will increasingly rally behind the climate mitigation 
effort. A holistic societal effort will be more and more important, as Finland is set to 
drastically reduce its greenhouse gas emissions in years to come. In this sense, it is 
interesting for Finland to draw lessons from the 1990s, and try to utilise today the 
features that account for its success in ICT. Despite challenges ahead, Finland should 
realise the opportunity it has to instigate a new and more sustainable ‘miracle’, and 
thereby once again showcase on the world stage the value of the Finnish model. 
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Appendices  
 
 
Appendix 1: Questions for Loup Verlet (former scientist, philosopher, 
psychologist). Interview undertaken on 24 June 2013. 
In your books, you mention the need for more equalitarian societies, and the role this 
may have on the reduction of carbon emissions. Interestingly, Finland is one of the most 
equalitarian societies in the world. How do you think this may impact carbon 
emissions? 
In your book published in 2007, you interviewed numerous French politicians. Do you 
think the political discourse has evolved since then with respect to climate change? 
At the scale of one country, how could we get things to evolve in politics? If politicians 
in Europe today fail to act, it is not necessarily because other countries have failed to do 
the same… 
What is the role played by nuclear energy today in the mitigation of global warming? 
Should we combine nuclear energy with research in renewable energies? 
In your latest book, you interview professionals throughout France who work jobs 
associated with the climate. Would you say they are optimistic today, with respect to the 
current situation and the political ambition? Do they feel assisted, or on the contrary 
alone in their effort? 
In your 2007 book, you establish a very interesting link between the industrial 
revolution and what perhaps should be replicated today in the effort of mitigating 
climate change. Do you think that today we are on the right track in terms of 
technological revolution, but perhaps what is still missing is political change? 
In your latest book, dedicated to green jobs, you interview a French forest engineer. In 
Finland the management of forests is of outmost importance and indeed at the heart of 
the climate strategy. Is it the case in France? Is the management of forests satisfactory?  
Why would a society that may actually benefit from climate change act to help people 
in other parts who may suffer from it much sooner? 
In your latest book you also interview people who work in the education sector, 
including people trying to raise awareness on green jobs. Is this form of education 
building up in France at the moment? 
Appendix 2: Questions for Liisa Selvenius-Hurme (chairperson of 
Ilmastovanhemmat). Interview undertaken on 27 November 2013. 
Could you tell me a little about Ilmastovanhemmat, and its ambitions? What message 
are you seeking to send to Finnish policymakers?  
In your mind, is Finland doing enough to mitigate its carbon emissions?  
What may be slowing down political action in the country?  
What should be given priority in your opinion, in terms of the national mitigation 
effort? What could be the benefits for the current and future Finnish society of a 
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stringent climate change mitigation strategy?  
Would you say the Finnish public is well aware and concerned about global warming? 
Do you think the Finnish public is well inclined to change its lifestyles, in the aim of 
helping the country decrease its carbon emissions?  
Appendix 3: Questions for Feodor Aminoff (CEO of Ultranat). Interview 
undertaken on 28 November 2013. 
How did you fund the development of your innovations? Did you receive financial 
assistance from the Finnish government, or another institution, at any point? 
Is it difficult and lengthy to secure patenting for innovations in Finland? What are the 
issues associated with this particular step? 
Would you say the Finnish authorities encouraged and supported you in the 
development of cleantech innovations? 
Would you say people you have met or contacted were enthusiastic about your 
cleantech projects? 
Do you think there is a real desire in the Finnish society to develop and implement clean 
technology innovations? 
Is the Finnish climate change mitigation strategy on the right track according to your 
personal experience? Is it well implemented on the ground? Should policies be 
improved (e.g. tougher ‘polluter pays’ principle, more subsidies, etc.)? 
Do you think developing your clean technology innovations would have been easier, or 
more difficult, in another country? If so, why? 
Are you hopeful as to the Future of the Finnish green business environment? 
Appendix 4: Questions for Jonne Hellgren (CEO of RePack). Interview 
undertaken on 29 November 2013. 
What are you trying to achieve with RePack? 
Are there particular reasons leading you to invest in the area of clean technologies?  
How did you fund the development of RePack? What were the main costs involved? 
Did you receive financial assistance from the Finnish government, or another 
institution, at any point?  
Would you say the Finnish authorities encouraged and supported you in the 
development of RePack?  
Was it difficult and lengthy to secure patenting for your innovation? 
What were the issues associated with this particular step? 
Would you say people you have met or contacted were enthusiastic about RePack?  
Do you think there is a real desire in the Finnish society to develop and implement clean 
technology innovations such as RePack? 
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Appendix 5: Questions for Oras Tynkkynen (member of the Finnish 
Parliament, Green League). Interview undertaken on 20 December 2013. 
Finland, a country with historically high emissions per capita, has managed to 
drastically decrease since 2010 its carbon emissions. How has Finland achieved this 
reduction in practice?  
Will climate change be a serious issue for Finland? There are claims that global 
warming could actually have positive effects on the Finnish economy in the short run. 
Do you think this could affect the willingness of politicians to act, or the public’s view 
on the issue?  
Has Finland set ambitious carbon mitigation targets for itself? Could you tell me a little 
about the planned efforts to achieve these targets? What should be given priority in your 
opinion? 
What is the role to be played by nuclear energy in this mitigation effort? Can renewable 
energy sources be developed quickly enough in Finland, for them to become a credible 
substitute to fossil fuels in the short term?  
Finland’s national strengths (strong and well-accepted state, socially responsible 
citizens, good education and know-how, multi-stakeholder collaboration, etc.) are 
appealing. In your opinion, is the Finnish society particularly well suited for the 
mitigation of climate change? 
Are you hopeful as to the future of the Finnish cleantech sector? In your mind, should 
Finland work to become a world leader in clean technologies? Does this sector have the 
potential to boost Finnish competiveness after the decline of the sector of ICT? What is 
the state doing to help Finnish businesses develop and thrive in this sector?  
Appendix 6: Questions for Timo Ritonummi (Deputy Director General, 
Head of Energy Efficiency and Growth Group, Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy). Interview undertaken on 10 February 2014. 
Can renewable energy sources be developed quickly enough in Finland, for them to 
become a credible substitute to fossil fuels in the short term? 
In your opinion, is the Finnish society particularly well suited for the mitigation of 
climate change? Certainly, Finland’s national strengths (strong and well-accepted state, 
socially responsible citizens, good education and know-how, multi-stakeholder 
collaboration, etc.) are appealing. 
Are you hopeful as to the future of the Finnish cleantech sector? In your mind, should 
Finland work to become a world leader in clean technologies? Does this sector have the 
potential to boost Finnish competiveness after the decline of the sector of ICT? What is 
the state doing to help Finnish businesses develop and thrive in this sector? 	  
